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Note 
LET JUDGES JUDGE:  ADVANCING A REVIEW 
FRAMEWORK FOR GOVERNMENT SECURITIES 
SETTLEMENTS WHERE DEFENDANTS NEITHER ADMIT 
NOR DENY ALLEGATIONS 
GEORGE L. MILES 
It has become increasingly common in the years following the 
2008 financial crisis for the public to read news headlines of the 
latest hundred million dollar settlements reached between the United 
States federal government and major corporations wherein the 
defendants do not admit or deny the charges alleged.  This Note 
analyzes why one agency in particular, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, has come to rely almost exclusively on these types of 
settlements, and, through a close examination of a recent case on 
appeal in the Second Circuit (SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets 
Inc.), documents how the courts have struggled with allowing them 
to be finalized due to the absence of sufficient factual support.  It 
concludes that further development of the existing standard for 
judicial review is needed, and proposes a framework that would 
increase transparency and accountability surrounding these types of 
government settlements.  
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LET JUDGES JUDGE:  ADVANCING A REVIEW 
FRAMEWORK FOR GOVERNMENT SECURITIES 
SETTLEMENTS WHERE DEFENDANTS NEITHER ADMIT 
NOR DENY ALLEGATIONS 
GEORGE L. MILES* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The history of the financial markets in the United States since the 
outset of the twentieth century is a story of periodic, catastrophic failures, 
starting with the Panic of 1907, through the Stock Market Crash of 1929, 
to the financial crisis of 2008.1  In response to each crisis, the federal 
government enacted new laws or created new regulatory and enforcement 
agencies to better safeguard the public.2  One such agency, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), arose out of the Great Depression with 
a continuing mission to “protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and 
efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”3   
While the SEC can point to numerous examples where it has 
responded with indictments against bad actors,4 the agency has regrettably 
failed to deter multiple recent calamities from the dot-com crash of 2000, 
to the accounting scandals of 2001–2002 that led to the bankruptcies of 
Enron and WorldCom, through incidents in the mutual fund market in 
                                                                                                                          
* University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate with Certificate in Law and Public 
Policy 2014; Yale University, B.A. 2005.  I would like to thank the staffs of Volumes 45 and 46 of the 
Connecticut Law Review who contributed to the editing of this Note.  I would also like to thank my 
parents, Nancy Lunney and George Albert Miles, for their past and continued love and support. 
1 Abigail Tucker, The Financial Panic of 1907: Running from History, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Oct. 
10, 2008), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history-archaeology/1907_Panic.html. 
2 See, e.g., Creating the Consumer Bureau, CFPB, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-
bureau/creatingthebureau (last visited Jan. 16, 2014) (detailing how the recent financial crisis led to the 
passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and the creation of the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-
Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1019, 1020–21 (2012) (highlighting instances of new legislation following economic catastrophes 
and discussing the motivations for such legislation). 
3 The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and 
Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified June 6, 
2013). 
4 E.g., SEC Enforcement Actions: Addressing Misconduct that Led to or Arose from the Financial 
Crisis, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enf-actions-fc.shtml (last modified Sept. 3, 2013). 
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2003–2004 and stock option backdating in 2006, to the latest crisis.5  As a 
result of this poor performance, one of the SEC’s own Commissioners 
grimily acknowledged studies that have reported that “79% of investors 
have no trust in the financial system” and “61% of investors have no 
confidence in government regulators.”6  This is very troublesome 
considering the still fragile economy7 in which almost three-quarters of 
Americans’ financial assets are invested in securities-related products.8 
The most frequent and freshest criticism leveled against federal 
enforcement agencies by the news media and Congress is that those who 
work in our nation’s largest financial institutions have become “too big to 
jail.”9  While the SEC, which is strictly a civil enforcement entity, has no 
authority to incarcerate criminals,10 several financial reporters and legal 
commentators have argued that the agency’s policies, specifically its 
overreliance on negotiating backdoor settlements instead of openly 
prosecuting illegal activity in courts, insufficiently punishes misconduct 
and is ineffective in deterring risky behaviors that create new crises.11  
Indeed, it has been argued that the SEC settles its investigations anywhere 
from 67%,12 to 90%,13 or 98%14 of the time, often with recidivist 
                                                                                                                          
5 John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better 
Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 712–13 (2009).  
6 Luis Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Taking a No-Nonsense Approach to 
Enforcing the Federal Securities Laws, Address Before the Securities Enforcement Forum 2012 (Oct. 
18, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171491510. 
7 See Jonathan Weisman, Senate Passes $3.7 Trillion Budget, Setting Up Contentious 
Negotiations, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2013, at A20 (quoting U.S. Senator Patty Murray who said “[w]ith 
an unemployment rate that remains stubbornly high, and a middle class that has seen their wages 
stagnate for far too long, we simply cannot afford any threats to our fragile recovery”). 
8 Coffee & Sale, supra note 5, at 727. 
9 E.g., Press Release, Sherrod Brown: Senator for Ohio, Sens. Brown, Grassley Press Justice 
Department on “Too Big To Jail” (Jan. 29, 2013), available at 
http://www.brown.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/sens-brown-grassley-press-justice-department-
on-too-big-to-jail; Editorial, Too Big to Fail, Too Big to Jail, NEW HAVEN REG. (Jan. 1, 2013), 
http://www.nhregister.com/general-news/20130101/editorial-too-big-to-fail-too-big-to-jail.  
10 Robert Khuzami, Dir., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Div. of Enforcement, Remarks Before the 
Consumer Federation of America’s Financial Services Conference (Dec. 1, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch120111rk.htm. 
11 E.g., Ross MacDonald, Note, Setting Examples, Not Settling: Toward a New Enforcement 
Paradigm, 91 TEX. L. REV. 419, 419–20 (2012); Matt Levine, Maybe This Time Citi Actually Will Stop 
Violating Securities Laws, but Don’t Hold Your Breath, DEALBREAKER (Nov. 8, 2011, 6:49 PM), 
http://dealbreaker.com/2011/11/maybe-this-time-citi-actually-will-stop-violating-securities-laws-but-
dont-hold-your-breath.  
12 Examining the Settlement Practices of U.S. Financial Regulators: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 28 (2012) [hereinafter Settlement Practices Hearing] (statement of 
Robert Khuzami, Director, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Enforcement). 
13 Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from Enforcement Against 
Broker-Dealers, 67 BUS. LAW. 679, 698 (2012). 
14 MacDonald, supra note 11, at 421. 
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corporations.15  One specific aspect of these settlements, which allows 
defendants to settle without admitting or denying the allegations of 
wrongdoing in a complaint,16 has garnered considerable negative attention 
and drawn the ire of several judges tasked with reviewing the 
agreements.17 
One case in particular, SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc.,18 which 
is now before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,19 
has led to a congressional hearing20 and sparked extensive coverage in the 
press,21 as well as analysis by industry lawyers22 and academics.23  Around 
October 2006, various members of Citigroup’s financial securities 
subsidiary Citigroup Global Markets Inc. (“CGMI”) allegedly sought to 
profit by betting against assets from a collateralized debt obligation 
(“CDO”) that CGMI itself structured and marketed.24  Working with 
another investment company, CGMI created and opened a $1 billion CDO 
titled “Class V Funding III” (“Class V III”) that closed on February 28, 
2007.25  CGMI “exercised significant influence” over the construction of 
Class V III resulting in subprime residential mortgage-backed securities 
                                                                                                                          
15 Jayne W. Barnard, Securities Fraud, Recidivism, and Deterrence, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 189, 
220 (2008). 
16 See 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(e) (2013) (“[T]he Commission believes that a refusal to admit the 
allegations is equivalent to a denial, unless the defendant or respondent states that he neither admits nor 
denies the allegations.”). 
17 Rakoff’s Revenge, ECONOMIST (Apr. 13, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-
economics/21576132-rejections-settlements-financial-institutions-are-catching-rakoffs. 
18 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
19 Peter Lattman, Court Hears Arguments on Judge’s Rejection of S.E.C.-Citigroup Deal, 
DEALBOOK (Feb. 8, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/08/appeals-court-hears-arguments-
over-judge-rakoffs-rejection-of-citigroup-settlement. 
20 Settlement Practices Hearing, supra note 12, at 1–2 (statement of Rep. Spencer Bachus, 
Chairman, House Committee on Financial Services). 
21 E.g., David S. Hilzenrath, Judge Chafes at Size of SEC Deal with Citigroup, WASH. POST, Nov. 
10, 2011, at A16; Nate Raymond, Appeals Court Hears Arguments in SEC’s Case Against Citigroup, 
REUTERS (Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/08/us-citigroup-sec-appeal-
idUSBRE9170YQ20130208.   
22 E.g., William O. Reckler & Blake T. Denton, Understanding Recent Changes to the SEC’s 
“Neither Admit nor Deny” Settlement Policy, LATHAM & WATKINS (Jan. 12, 2012), 
http://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/sec-eliminates-denial-option-for-settling-defendants; F. Joseph 
Warin et al., “Potential Game-Changer” at Two Years: The SEC’s Use of Deferred and Non-
Prosecution Agreements, FINDLAW (May 25, 2012), http://practice.findlaw.com/practice-guide/-
potential-game-changer-at-two-years-the-sec-s-use-of-deferred-.html. 
23 E.g., Michael C. Macchiarola, “Hallowed by History, but Not by Reason”: Judge Rakoff’s 
Critique of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Consent Judgment Practice, 16 CUNY L. REV. 
51 (2012).  
24 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Citigroup to Pay $285 Million to Settle SEC 
Charges for Misleading Investors About CDO Tied to Housing Market (Oct. 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-214.htm. 
25 Id. 
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accounting for half of the CDO’s value.26  Additionally, CGMI used credit 
default swaps to purchase $500 million worth of protection, which 
amounted, in financial terms, to taking a “short position” on the portfolio.27  
In evaluating the CDO, the SEC highlighted experienced traders who 
commented that “the portfolio is horrible,” that the assets are “‘dogsh!t’ 
and ‘possibly the best short EVER!’”28  Almost nine months after the CDO 
was put on the market, it defaulted, causing approximately fifteen investors 
to lose “virtually their entire investments”29 that had an original “face value 
of approximately $843 million,”30 while CGMI netted “at least $160 
million” in fees and trading profits.31   
The general public became familiar with CDOs following the 2008 
financial crisis in which these highly complex products magnified the 
severity of the disaster.32  Investors in CDOs who believed they were either 
misled or defrauded by marketing materials from bank underwriters or 
CDO managers have filed numerous lawsuits but, thus far, they have had 
limited success.33  Notably, Citigroup alone marketed more than $20 
billion in CDOs during 2007, “most of which failed spectacularly.”34  A 
Citigroup spokesman in 2011 expressed the belief that the Class V III case 
is the only action the SEC will take concerning its CDOs.35 
At issue on appeal in the Citigroup case is District Court Judge Jed 
Rakoff’s refusal to approve a settled $285 million consent judgment 
reached between the two parties where CGMI neither admitted nor denied 
the allegations of the SEC complaint.36  Judge Rakoff based his ruling on 
the failure of the settlement to present enough factual evidence to pass the 
accepted judicial review standard:37 ‘‘whether the proposed Consent 
Judgment . . . is fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the public interest.’’38  
                                                                                                                          
26 Complaint at 1–2, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(No. 11 Civ. 7387). 
27 Id.  See generally JEFF CONNAUGHTON, THE PAYOFF: WHY WALL STREET ALWAYS WINS 148–
49 (2012) (providing more information on short selling securities). 
28 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 24. 
29 Id. 
30 Complaint, supra note 26, at 16. 
31 Id. at 3. 
32 Fanni Koszeg, Will CDO Managers Be Held Accountable for Their Role in the Financial 
Crisis?, BLOOMBERG BNA (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.bna.com/cdo-managers-held-n17179870393/. 
33 Id. 
34 Jesse Eisinger & Jake Bernstein, Did Citi Get a Sweet Deal? Bank Claims SEC Settlement on 
One CDO Clears It on All Others, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.propublica.org/article/did-
citi-get-a-sweet-deal-banks-says-sec-settlement-on-one-cdo-clears-it-on. 
35 Id. 
36 SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 330, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
37 Id. at 330. 
38 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Memorandum by Plaintiff Securities & Exchange 
Commission in Support of Proposed Settlement at 5, Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 
(No. 11 Civ. 7387)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Judge Rakoff blamed the SEC for the lack of proof, writing that the agency 
“has a duty, inherent in its statutory mission, to see that the truth emerges; 
and if it fails to do so, this Court must not, in the name of deference or 
convenience, grant judicial enforcement.”39 
While several have commented on how the Citigroup case should 
affect the manner in which the SEC conducts its work in the future40 or 
advocated that Congress should pass new laws to expand the SEC’s 
powers,41 no one yet has argued what role the judiciary should play in any 
change.42  Regardless of how the Second Circuit ultimately decides the 
Citigroup case, other judges in other districts have raised issues with or 
rejected similar settlements,43 and so the topic will not be clearly resolved 
in the near future.  At the heart of the controversy is a separation of powers 
issue concerning how much discretion federal judges must give executive 
agencies, and how jurists and regulators do and should consider the public 
interest when deciding to resolve cases.   
This Note does not contend that courts can or should strip the agency 
of its ability to settle cases on a no admit, no deny (“NAND”) basis.  But it 
argues, based on a careful examination of the history and policy 
machinations behind NAND settlements, that the current judicial review 
standard does not appropriately handle the complexity of the issues and 
interests involved.  As this Note’s summary of the Citigroup case and 
others will demonstrate, NAND settlements can lead to the submission of 
factually deficient court documents that blur the lines of illegal conduct 
thereby weakening transparency of securities enforcement for the courts 
and the public.  Recidivism by defendants is incited due to the opaqueness 
of these types of agreements coupled with the fact that they regularly 
diminish the size and scope of the punishments imposed.  Absent a guilty 
admission of statutory violations, misconduct is written off as a cost of 
doing business, with the price worth paying because these types of 
                                                                                                                          
39 Id. at 335. 
40 E.g., MacDonald, supra note 11, at 447. 
41 Letter from Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Senator Jack Reed, 
Chairman, Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs (Nov. 
28, 2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/74820022/Mary-Schapiro-s-Letter-to-Senator-Jack-
Reed.  
42 See Gadinis, supra note 13, at 682 (“[A]cademic commentators have largely ignored this area 
of the law in the last two decades, despite continuous practitioner interest.”). 
43 See SEC v. Hohol, No. 14-C-41, 2014 WL 461217 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 5, 2014) (order requesting 
additional information as to why the court should accept the proposed judgments); SEC v. Bridge 
Premium Fin., LLC, No. 1:12-cv-02131-JLK-BNB (D. Colo. Jan. 17, 2013) (order denying entry of 
final judgments); Edward Wyatt, In Challenging S.E.C. Settlement, a Judge in Wisconsin Cites a Court 
in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2011, at B4 (discussing a SEC settlement with the Koss 
Corporation before the Eastern District of Wisconsin); Christopher M. Matthews, Judge Blasts IBM, 
SEC Bribery Settlement, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 20, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788
7323777204578192040347143214.html (summarizing a district court judge’s decision from the 
District of Columbia that rejected a SEC settlement with IBM). 
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settlements severely undercut efforts by members of the public who are 
harmed by violations to recover their losses.44   
Indeed, the central tradeoff with NAND settlements from a regulatory 
standpoint is that judgments without that provision would collaterally estop 
(i.e., preclude) the defendants from re-litigating the same allegations in 
later private civil suits, thereby increasing the probability that investors 
could successfully recover damages.45  By contrast, a NAND settlement 
compels harmed investors to establish their own evidence to fully recover 
their losses.  This is troubling.  Consider, for example, the Citigroup case 
in which only $285 million was potentially set aside to the group of 
investors46 who collectively lost $700 to $843 million.47  The investors are 
left on their own, unable to use the SEC’s investigation as a basis for their 
claims.  Given the time and taxpayer money the SEC undoubtedly spent 
investigating the case, it is worrisome that the current system sanctions 
settlements where only a fraction of the overall harm (34–41% in 
Citigroup) is penalized and members of the public are given little 
assistance in addressing the matter.  It logically follows that extra costs are 
shifted onto the courts as well since they must spend more time overseeing 
private suits that are more drawn-out as a result of the SEC’s deal-making.   
 This Note argues that the interests of the public, especially those of 
harmed investors, must be given more consideration by those who work at 
the SEC and in the judiciary, and the Citigroup case and those of its ilk 
present opportunities to cultivate a better enforcement framework that can 
more productively utilize the energies and balance the interests of the 
public, the courts, and the SEC.  Instead of allowing ineffective NAND 
agreements to continue in their current form, this Note proposes that the 
courts are justified in elaborating upon the current standard for settlement 
review to demand that an adequate set of proven or admitted facts be 
presented to allow judges to sufficiently review settlements’ terms.  
Agreements that establish a more solid evidentiary foundation will 
improve the overall enforcement scheme by empowering harmed investors 
within the general public to pursue private litigation that can further 
                                                                                                                          
44 Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 333–34; see also Aguilar, supra note 6 (noting 
a SEC Commissioner’s admission that “[i]n the case of senior executives and other highly-compensated 
persons, a defendant may very likely view a fine as an inconsequential cost of doing business”). 
45 Brian A. Ochs et al., Sanctions and Collateral Consequences: The Stakes in SEC Enforcement 
Actions, in THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT MANUAL: TACTICS AND STRATEGIES 181, 242 (Michael J. 
Missal & Richard M. Phillips eds., 2d ed. 2007). 
46 Memorandum by Plaintiff Securities & Exchange Commission in Support of Proposed 
Settlement, supra note 38, at 3–4, 6. 
47 There is a discrepancy between the original face value of the investments, $843 million, 
Complaint, supra note 26, at 16, and the actual losses to investors, which the SEC later argued were “in 
excess of $700 million,” SEC’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Questions Posed by the Court 
Regarding Proposed Settlement at 17, Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (No. 11 Civ. 
7387). 
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discipline the conduct in the financial markets.  The occurrence of such 
astoundingly large settlements of $550 and $616 million that have taken 
place recently48 would arguably decrease in the face of a more robust 
enforcement system. 
Part II will survey the factually deficient background of the Citigroup 
case and summarize the central legal arguments surrounding its current 
appeal to the Second Circuit.  Next, Part III will examine the major actors 
behind public and private securities law enforcement, beginning with an 
analysis of the SEC, specifically the origin and development of its 
enforcement program and settlement processes.  Part III concludes with a 
review of the hurdles placed in front of harmed investors seeking to 
privately recover for losses due to securities fraud.  Part IV will assess the 
traditional role of the judiciary and the evolution of its standards for 
granting injunctive relief, followed by a brief survey of the SEC’s recent 
case resolution history.  Finally, before concluding, Part V will present a 
novel legal review framework that builds upon existing case law to create a 
stronger check against improper securities settlements. 
II.  CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING 
SEC V. CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS INC. 
A.  The Initial Filings 
On October 19, 2011, the SEC filed a complaint in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging that 
Citigroup’s subsidiary CGMI misled investors by “negligently 
misrepresenting key deal terms” relating to Class V III.49  The circular for 
the fund merely mentioned that “[t]he Initial CDS Asset Counterparty [i.e., 
CGMI] may provide CDS Assets as an intermediary with matching off-
setting positions requested by the Manager or may provide CDS Assets 
alone without any off-setting positions.”50  CGMI buried this information 
on page 88 of its 192-page marketing document.51  The SEC argued that 
though CGMI had interests adverse to those of the other CDO investors, 
the investors were never put on notice that CGMI had a role in the CDO’s 
asset selection process or that it had a $500 million short position bet 
against those same assets.52  Put differently, because Class V III contained 
ultimately worthless subprime mortgage-backed securities,53 CGMI was 
                                                                                                                          
48 Michael Rothfeld et al., SAC Hit With Record Insider Penalty, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2013, at 
A1.   
49 Complaint, supra note 26, at 3; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 24. 
50 Complaint, supra note 26, at 15 (emphases added). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 16. 
53 Id. at 1; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 24. 
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accused of crafting a bad bet and promoting it to clients as a good bet, 
while the company itself took the actual good bet by shorting the fund.54 
In relation to CGMI, the SEC submitted separate, additional charges 
against only one specific individual: former employee Brian Stoker.55  The 
factual allegations in the Citigroup complaint indicated that other CGMI 
employees were also involved in this CDO scheme; however, the SEC was 
careful not to disclose those individuals by their full names and instead 
resorted to providing broad title descriptions such as “Trading Desk Head” 
or “senior Citigroup CDO structurer.”56  Similarly, although the SEC v. 
Stoker57 complaint alleged that the defendant was the “lead structurer on 
Class V III,”58 it mentioned him regularly communicating with other 
unnamed Citi executives, indicating that Mr. Stoker was a lower-level 
employee in the company hierarchy.59 
The same day that the SEC brought charges, it announced a settlement 
with CGMI whereby the company would: (1) disgorge itself of $160 
million in alleged “net profits” (plus $30 million in interest) as well as pay 
a civil penalty of $95 million; (2) undertake for three years certain internal 
measures to prevent similar fraud from happening again; and (3) agree to 
be permanently restrained and enjoined from future violations alleged in 
the complaint.60  The SEC made no guarantee that it would distribute any 
of those funds to harmed investors.  Instead it merely noted that it “may by 
motion propose a plan” to do so in the future.61  CGMI agreed to this 
settlement “without admitting or denying” the SEC’s allegations.62  Since 
the deal sought future enforcement of the agreement’s terms, it required 
court approval.63 
Toward supporting the settlement’s authorization (also referred to as 
either a consent judgment or consent decree), the SEC filed a 
                                                                                                                          
54 Claire A. Hill, Bankers Behaving Badly? The Limits of Regulatory Reform, 31 REV. BANKING 
& FIN. L. 675, 679–80 n.10 (2012). 
55 Memorandum by Plaintiff Securities & Exchange Commission in Support of Proposed 
Settlement, supra note 38, at 4.  The SEC brought separate settled charges against the collateral 
manager for the CDO transaction, Credit Suisse, as well as that company’s portfolio manager 
responsible for the transaction.  Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 24.  This Note 
focuses exclusively on CGMI’s and its employees’ conduct within this fraudulent scheme. 
56 Complaint, supra note 26, at 9. 
57 865 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
58 Complaint at 2, Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 2d 457 (No. 11 Civ. 7388). 
59 See, e.g., id. at 11 (“[A] Managing Director on Citigroup’s CDO trading desk sent Stoker a list 
of 21 recent-vintage, mezzanine CDOs on which the CDO trading desk wished to buy protection from 
the CDO squared.”). 
60 Memorandum by Plaintiff Securities & Exchange Commission in Support of Proposed 
Settlement, supra note 38, at 3–4. 
61 Id. at 3–4, 6. 
62 Proposed Final Judgment as to Defendant Citigroup Global Markets Inc. at 1, SEC v. Citigroup 
Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11 Civ. 7387). 
63 Id. at 7. 
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memorandum to the court centrally arguing the settlement met the judicial 
evaluation standard in that it was “fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the 
public interest.”64  Additionally, in this filing, the SEC listed nine relevant 
factors it had identified for determining the extent to which the agency may 
penalize a corporation:  
(i) corporate benefits from the violation; (ii) impact on 
injured investors and current shareholders; (iii) need for 
deterrence; (iv) pervasiveness of the conduct; (v) degree of 
scienter; (vi) extent of the harm to investors; (vii) difficulty 
of detecting the violations; (viii) voluntary remedial 
measures; and (ix) extent of the cooperation, if any, with the 
Commission and other law enforcement agencies.65 
The SEC added that it “attempts to assess the extent of the sanction 
that will best serve the interests of investors and the public while 
maintaining consistency with penalty amounts previously imposed in 
similar cases.”66 
The SEC stated it was owed “substantial deference . . . as the 
regulatory body having primary responsibility for policing the securities 
markets,”67 and that the court “should be satisfied that the penalty reflects 
an adequate consideration of relevant penalty factors.”68  The SEC 
provided only four short paragraphs outlining why the settlement 
sufficiently satisfied the evaluation standards.69  Within those paragraphs 
the agency restated certain factual allegations, such as the amount it 
suggested CGMI profited from the fraud, but it did not reference or 
provide any comparisons to other past SEC-Citigroup settlements, nor did 
it address certain factors such as the pervasiveness of the deceit in the 
company or the challenge in discovering the scheme.70  
B.  Opposition to Settlement 
Judge Rakoff was assigned to this case and on October 27, 2011, he 
issued an order to the parties where he laid out a series of questions he 
                                                                                                                          
64 Memorandum by Plaintiff Securities & Exchange Commission in Support of Proposed 
Settlement, supra note 38, at 4–5 (quoting SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp, No. 09 Civ. 6829 (JSR), 2009 
WL 2842940, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
65 Id. at 5–6 (citing Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm). 
66 Id. at 6. 
67 Id. at 5 (quoting SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., Nos. 09 Civ. 6829 (JSR), 10 Civ. 0215 (JSR), 
2010 WL 624581, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 6–7. 
70 Id. 
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would ask at a November 9, 2011 hearing toward reaching a decision 
concerning the consent judgment.71  Judge Rakoff’s inquiries ranged from 
the methodological (how the SEC calculated the $95 million penalty) to 
the philosophical (questioning how judgment can be imposed against 
someone who neither admits nor denies wrongdoing), permitting the 
parties to provide written responses in addition to speaking at the hearing.72  
Further complicating matters were attempts from several outside parties to 
oppose the deal in court.  On November 5, 2011, Better Markets submitted 
a motion to intervene.73  In its supporting memorandum, Better Markets—a 
non-profit organization—argued that it should be allowed to object to the 
proposed settlement primarily because “the SEC has not, is not and will 
not adequately represent the public interest.”74  Judge Rakoff denied Better 
Markets’s motion on grounds presented by the SEC75 in the agency’s 
opposition memorandum.76  Similarly, three insurance companies involved 
in private litigation against CGMI requested that they collectively be 
allowed to file an amicus curiae brief in opposition to the settlement so that 
the evidence collected by the SEC investigation would “see the light of 
day.”77  Judge Rakoff denied their motion based on arguments made by 
CGMI.78  
The news media and industry commentators expressed substantial 
criticism of the settlement immediately before and after the court hearing, 
much of which centered on the SEC’s failure to acknowledge Citigroup’s 
recent past.  Citigroup was characterized as a “serial fraud offender”79 and 
                                                                                                                          
71 Order at 1, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11 
Civ. 7387). 
72 Id. at 1–3. 
73 Motion to Intervene Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure at 24, Citigroup Global Mkts. 
Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (No. 11 Civ. 7387). 
74 Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Intervene at 1, Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 
F. Supp. 2d 328 (No. 11 Civ. 7387). 
75 Order Denying Motion to Intervene, Citigroup Global Mrkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (No. 11 
Civ. 7387). 
76 Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Intervene Pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure at 24, Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (No. 11 Civ. 7387).  The 
SEC argued that Better Markets had “no direct, concrete, and legally protected interest in the outcome.”  
Id. at 1.  The agency also noted that “there is a presumption that the [SEC] is representing the interests 
of the public in the financial markets,” and that “Better Markets’ disagreement with the terms of the 
proposed consent judgment does not establish that the public interest is represented inadequately by the 
[SEC].”  Id. at 2. 
77 Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. et al. Notice of Motion and Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae 
Brief at 3, Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (No. 11 Civ. 7387).   
78 Order Denying Motion to File Amicus Curiae Brief, Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 
2d 328 (No. 11 Civ. 7387).     
79 Matt Taibbi, Finally, a Judge Stands Up to Wall Street, TAIBBLOG (Nov. 10, 2011, 10:07 AM), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/blogs/taibblog/finally-a-judge-stands-up-to-wall-street-20111110. 
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“repeat offender” of violating securities laws.80  Reportedly, the SEC had 
accused CGMI of securities fraud five times since 200381 and, in each 
instance, NAND settlements were reached where Citigroup either 
consented to a SEC order, barring it from committing the same types of 
violations again, or to a court injunction.82  A Citigroup spokesman denied 
that the Class V III-related settlement had any connection to these past 
charges, stating that “[l]ike all other major financial institutions, Citi has 
entered into various settlements with the S.E.C. over the years and there is 
no basis for any assertion that Citi has violated the terms of any of those 
settlements.”83 
However the media examined those past deals and seriously 
questioned why the SEC was not enforcing the terms of its prior 
agreements with Citigroup.  The agency already had two cease-and-desist 
orders, one from a 2005 settlement and the other from a 2006 case, which 
barred Citigroup from “future violations of the same section of the 
securities laws that the company now stands accused of breaking again.”84  
One commentator suggested that the SEC could have charged Citigroup in 
its 2011 complaint for violating a different fraud statute such that the 
agency “could have triggered a violation of a court injunction that 
Citigroup agreed to in 2003, as part of a $400 million settlement over 
allegedly fraudulent analyst-research reports.”85  Yet even when the SEC 
had a prior chance to actually utilize that injunction in another instance 
involving Citigroup in December 2008, it decided not to ask that the 
existing court order be enforced but instead reached a new agreement that 
included a new injunction order.86  Finally, in each of the settlements, the 
agency granted waivers so that Citigroup could continue its business; yet 
when the company would later be accused of breaking the same laws 
again, the SEC never revoked any of the prior waivers.87    
Several commentators also criticized the lack of facts provided by the 
SEC in support of the proposed 2011 agreement.  It was argued the facts 
alleged in the complaint “suggested deliberate misconduct” by Citigroup 
and that the one named defendant was simply “a low-level banker who 
                                                                                                                          
80 Going to Court to Stop SEC Settlement with Citigroup, BETTER MARKETS (Nov. 6, 2011, 2:48 
PM), http://bettermarkets.com/blogs/going-court-stop-sec-settlement-citigroup. 
81 Jonathan Weil, Citigroup Finds Obeying the Law Is Too Darn Hard, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Nov. 
7, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-02/citigroup-finds-obeying-the-law-is-too-darn-
hard-jonathan-weil.html. 
82 Id. 
83 Edward Wyatt, Promises Made, and Remade, by Firms in S.E.C. Fraud Cases, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 8, 2011, at A1.  
84 Weil, supra note 81. 
85 See id. (claiming the agency “neatly avoided that outcome”). 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
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clearly didn’t act alone.”88  It was also noted that the SEC simply provided 
an estimate of the revenues and benefits Citigroup made from the alleged 
fraud without disclosing concrete details.89  Better Markets’s President 
asserted that, in what then was “the second quickest CDO deal to fail in 
history,” Citigroup made “at least $624 million and almost certainly much 
more” while its investors lost “at least $847 million.”90   
The scale of the settlement, as compared to the largess of Citigroup, 
was also a point of criticism.  The $95 million penalty in the proposed 
settlement was described as “a pittance compared with [Citigroup’s] $3.8 
billion of earnings last quarter.”91  Better Markets called the settlement 
“indefensible” and the penalty “so trivial it isn’t even a rounding error to 
the global mega-bank” that has “$2 trillion in assets and revenues of more 
than $20 billion in the last three months.”92  An analogy was made to “a 
mugger who steals $70 from some lady’s wallet being sentenced to walk 
free after paying back twelve bucks.”93  The consensus opinion was that 
“[e]nough is enough.”94 
C.  The SEC and Citigroup Reactions 
In this environment, the SEC submitted a memorandum responding to 
Judge Rakoff’s order that was over four times the length of its original 
filing supporting the proposed consent judgment.95  The agency provided 
new background information claiming that it had conducted a “thorough 
investigation” and that the settlement was arrived at after “extensive 
                                                                                                                          
88 Id. 
89 Going to Court to Stop SEC Settlement with Citigroup, supra note 80. 
90 Dennis M. Kelleher, Are the SEC and Citigroup Deceiving a Federal Judge?, HUFFINGTON               
POST BUS. (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dennis-m-kelleher/are-the-sec-and-
citigroup_b_1096270.html. 
91 Weil, supra note 81. 
92 Going to Court to Stop SEC Settlement with Citigroup, supra note 80. 
93 Taibbi, supra note 79.  
94 Weil, supra note 81; see also Taibbi, supra note 79 (calling the SEC a “captured regulatory 
agency” that “does nothing except issue new (soon-to-be-ignored-again) injunctions”); Going to Court 
to Stop SEC Settlement with Citigroup, supra note 80 (“Such settlements don’t deter crime.  They 
reward it . . . .”).  But see Matt Levine, So Maybe Citi Created a Mortgage-Backed Security Filled with 
Loans They Knew Were Going to Fail so that They Could Sell It to a Client Who Wasn’t Aware that 
They Sabotaged It by Intentionally Picking the Misleadingly Rated Loans Most Likely to be Defaulted 
Upon, So What?, DEALBREAKER (Oct. 19, 2011, 2:16 PM), http://dealbreaker.com/2011/10/so-maybe-
citi-created-a-mortgage-backed-security-filled-with-loans-they-knew-were-going-to-fail-so-that-they-
could-sell-it-to-a-client-who-wasnt-aware-that-they-sabotaged-it-by-intentionally-picking/ (arguing that 
the investors should have recognized the risk of shorting involved, but acknowledging “the offering 
document isn’t exactly putting reference security quality front-and-center, or making credit analysis 
transparent”). 
95 Compare SEC’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Questions Posed by the Court Regarding 
Proposed Settlement, supra note 47 (twenty-nine pages), with Memorandum by Plaintiff Securities & 
Exchange Commission in Support of Proposed Settlement, supra note 38 (seven pages). 
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discussions and negotiations.”96  It acknowledged that “[i]t is reasonable to 
estimate . . . that total investor loss or expected loss with respect to the 
Class V [III] CDO transaction is in excess of $700 million,” but noted that 
“the precise calculation of investor losses is not required in connection 
with the resolution of an enforcement action brought by the SEC.”97  The 
agency provided no new estimate in terms of how much Citigroup 
benefited monetarily from the CDO98 and thus implicitly stood by its 
earlier net profits figure rather than revise it to a “gross gain” amount, 
which is mandated by statute.99  The SEC noted, “Citigroup did not 
provide an extraordinary level of cooperation to the Commission in the 
investigation of this matter.”100  The agency also recognized that Citigroup 
had been subject to prior enforcement actions but failed to state explicitly 
that recidivism was in fact considered.101 
Most significantly, the SEC argued that “[t]he proposed consent 
judgment embodying this settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, and 
should be entered by this Court,”102 thereby excluding the “public interest” 
requirement it had originally asserted.103  In a footnote, the SEC argued 
that:  
Although [it] strongly believes that the proposed consent 
judgment here is in the public interest, that is not part of 
applicable standard of judicial review.  As . . . the Second 
Circuit has held[,] . . . a consent decree in an SEC 
enforcement action ‘ought to be approved’ so long as it is not 
“unfair, inadequate, or unreasonable.”104   
The SEC next asserted that there was a presumption of fairness, 
adequacy, and reasonableness for the settlement since “the proposed 
consent judgment here was negotiated at arm’s length between parties 
represented by experienced counsel after a comprehensive 
                                                                                                                          
96 SEC’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Questions Posed by the Court Regarding Proposed 
Settlement, supra note 47, at 1. 
97 Id. at 17. 
98 See id. at 20 (“Citigroup directly benefited in the amount of approximately $160 million as a 
result of the Class V CDO transaction.”). 
99 See infra note 248 and accompanying text. 
100 SEC’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Questions Posed by the Court Regarding 
Proposed Settlement, supra note 47, at 21. 
101 See id. (noting “recidivism is taken into account by the Commission in determining the 
appropriate penalty in a given case” but not manifestly in this case). 
102 Id. at 1. 
103 Memorandum by Plaintiff Securities & Exchange Commission in Support of Proposed 
Settlement, supra note 38, at 5 (quoting SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp, No. 09-CV-6829 (JSR), 2009 WL 
2842940, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
104 SEC’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Questions Posed by the Court Regarding 
Proposed Settlement, supra note 47, at 4 n.1 (citations omitted) (quoting SEC v. Wang, 944 F.2d 80, 85 
(2d Cir. 1991)). 
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investigation.”105  Given that presumption, the agency stated that a court 
may reject the agreement “only if any of the terms appear ambiguous, if 
the enforcement mechanism is inadequate, if third parties will be positively 
injured, or if the decree otherwise makes a mockery of judicial power.”106  
The SEC asserted there were no such defects and that ultimately the district 
court should enter the judgment.107 
The SEC also notably addressed its NAND policy and argued that it 
sufficiently notifies the public about what took place.  It argued that “this 
approach has succeeded in clearly conveying that the conduct alleged did 
in fact occur.”108  The agency also noted that the public filing of the 
allegations via the complaint creates “transparency regarding misconduct 
by companies in the securities industry.”109  Finally it added that “whatever 
public interest is served by a factual resolution of any disputed issues is 
likely to be realized in the related proceedings against Mr. Stoker.”110 
CGMI also filed a response brief on November 7, 2011, in which it 
largely deferred to the arguments presented by the SEC.111  The company 
argued for the same legal standard that the agency asserted in its response 
filing.112  Regardless of whether CGMI considered the public interest to be 
a review requirement, it advocated that “as a general matter, the ‘public 
interest’ is served by sophisticated litigants compromising complicated 
matters in a manner that avoids wasteful litigation and exposing both 
parties to extreme results.”113 
CGMI also added to the factual background of the case by noting that 
the SEC’s investigation was a “multi-year inquiry” that created an 
“extensive record . . . which include[d] the review of over 30 million pages 
of documents and testimony from several current and former CGMI 
employees.”114  CGMI argued that there would be “a number of substantial 
factual and legal issues that would need to be litigated in the absence of a 
settlement.”115  For instance, it quoted from another page in its circular that 
                                                                                                                          
105 Id. at 9. 
106 Id. at 10 (quoting Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 12. 
109 Id. at 15. 
110 Id. 
111 Memorandum on Behalf of Citigroup Global Markets Inc. in Support of the Proposed Final 
Judgment and Consent at 6, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(No. 11 Civ. 7387). 
112 See id. at 5 (citing SEC v. Wang, 944 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1991); SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., 273 
F. Supp. 2d 431, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)) (“The standard for judicial review and approval of a proposed 
consent judgment in an SEC enforcement action is whether the settlement is fair, reasonable, and 
adequate.”). 
113 Id. at 6. 
114 Id. at 4. 
115 Id. 
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“CGMI ‘may be expected to have interests that are adverse to the interests 
of the Noteholders.’”116  The company emphasized that based on the SEC 
allegations, there was no deliberate intent or coordination at CGMI to 
violate the law.117   
D.  Judge Rakoff’s Response 
Media coverage of the hearing on November 9, 2011, characterized 
Judge Rakoff as “mock[ing] the SEC’s traditional way of doing business” 
as it concerned its NAND policy, and quoted him describing the agency’s 
unproven allegations as being “no better than rumor or gossip.”118  The 
Judge also “suggested that the injunctions are ‘just for show,’” and the 
requirement that CGMI take remedial steps to prevent future violations 
amounted to what he called “window dressing.”119  At one point, Judge 
Rakoff described the SEC’s argument that the court should not consider 
whether the settlement served the public interest as “[a]n interesting 
position,” adding that it left him “to exercise [his] power but not [his] 
judgment.”120  Ultimately the Judge did not rule from the bench after the 
hour-long hearing.121 
Instead he issued a written opinion on November 28, 2011, in which he 
rejected the parties’ consent judgment and set a trial date.122  Judge Rakoff 
began his opinion by questioning why the SEC chose to charge CGMI only 
with negligence when it seemed to allege intentional conduct against the 
company in its complaint against Brian Stoker by stating that: 
Citigroup knew it would be difficult to place the liabilities of 
[the Fund] if it disclosed to investors its intention to use the 
vehicle to short a hand-picked set of [poorly rated 
assets] . . . . By contrast, Citigroup knew that representing to 
investors that an experienced third-party investment adviser 
had selected the portfolio would facilitate the placement of 
the [Fund’s] liabilities.123 
                                                                                                                          
116 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
117 See id. at 17–19 (“[T]he SEC has elected to charge a mid-level CGMI employee with 
nonscienter-based violations of the securities laws . . .  and no employee senior to Mr. Stoker has been 
named in these proceedings.”). 
118 David S. Hilzenrath, Judge Chafes at Size of SEC Deal with Citigroup, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 
2011, at A16. 
119 Id. 
120 Jonathan Stempel & Grant McCool, Update 1-Judge Questions Adequacy of SEC-Citigroup 
Accord, REUTERS (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/09/citigroup-sec-
idUSN1E7A826C20111109. 
121 Id.  
122 SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
123 Id. at 330 (alteration in original) (quoting Complaint, supra note 58, at 10) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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Judge Rakoff then noted the change in review standards submitted in 
the SEC’s original memorandum as compared to its reply brief, and flatly 
rejected the notion that the public interest is not a requirement, calling such 
an assertion “erroneous.”124  The Judge pointed to opinions from the 
Supreme Court and the Second Circuit that directed courts in the context of 
granting injunctive relief to consider the “public interest”125 or “public 
consequences.”126  
Though Judge Rakoff acknowledged he must give “substantial 
deference to the views of the administrative agency”127 in these settlement 
matters, he rejected the idea that “the S.E.C. is the sole determiner of what 
is in the public interest.”128  Without directly citing any authority, the Judge 
argued that in these types of cases courts must apply “a modicum of 
independent judgment in determining whether the requested deployment of 
its injunctive powers will serve, or disserve, the public interest.  Anything 
less would not only violate the constitutional doctrine of separation of 
powers but would undermine the independence that is the indispensable 
attribute of the federal judiciary.”129  On that basis, Judge Rakoff argued he 
could not conduct an independent analysis because the SEC did “not 
provide the Court with a sufficient evidentiary basis to know whether the 
requested relief [was] justified.”130 
Going further, Judge Rakoff did not just question the paucity of facts 
presented, but also the existence and effects of the SEC’s NAND rule, 
describing it as “hallowed by history, but not by reason,” whereby it 
“deprives the Court of even the most minimal assurance that the substantial 
injunctive relief it is being asked to impose has any basis in fact.”131  He 
rejected the SEC’s argument that the public should view the allegations as 
facts because “[a]s a matter of law, an allegation that is neither admitted 
nor denied is simply that, an allegation.  It has no evidentiary value and no 
collateral estoppel effect.”132  Distinguishing NAND allegations from the 
information needed to conduct an independent review, Judge Rakoff 
indicated that he needed “proven or admitted facts”133 or “proven or 
acknowledged facts”134 and that ultimately, he was not given “any” of 
those specifics in this case.135 
                                                                                                                          
124 Id. at 330–31. 
125 Id. at 331 (citing eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)). 
126 Id. (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008)).  
127 Id. at 332. 
128 Id. at 331. 
129 Id.  
130 Id. at 332.  
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 333. 
133 Id. at 330. 
134 Id. at 335. 
135 Id. at 330, 335. 
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Turning to the relevant standard for judicial review,136 Judge Rakoff 
argued that all four requirements—that an agreement be fair, reasonable, 
adequate, and in the public interest—“inform each other.”137  As such, a 
deal must be “fair to parties and to the public.”138  Judge Rakoff 
determined that the proposed settlement, along with the NAND policy, 
served the narrow interests of just the parties.139  He argued that “[i]f the 
allegations of the Complaint are true, this is a very good deal for 
Citigroup;”140 mere “pocket change to any entity as large as Citigroup,”141 
and just “a cost of doing business.”142  He also noted that the agreement 
“imposes the kind of injunctive relief that Citigroup (a recidivist) knew 
that the S.E.C. had not sought to enforce against any financial institution 
for at least the last 10 years.”143  Judge Rakoff could not discern what the 
SEC would achieve beyond getting “a quick headline.”144 
In evaluating the four requirements, Judge Rakoff asserted that 
notwithstanding “the substantial deference due the S.E.C. in matters of this 
kind,”145 “the proposed Consent Judgment is neither fair, nor reasonable, 
nor adequate, nor in the public interest.”146  He explained that: 
It is not reasonable, because how can it ever be reasonable to 
impose substantial relief on the basis of mere allegations?  It 
is not fair, because, despite Citigroup’s nominal consent, the 
potential for abuse in imposing penalties on the basis of facts 
that are neither proven nor acknowledged is patent.  It is not 
adequate, because, in the absence of any facts, the Court 
lacks a framework for determining adequacy.  And, most 
obviously, the proposed Consent Judgment does not serve the 
public interest, because it asks the Court to employ its power 
and assert its authority when it does not know the facts.147 
Judge Rakoff concluded that if he were to accept the SEC-CGMI 
agreement without “some knowledge of what the underlying facts 
                                                                                                                          
136 “Whether the proposed Consent Judgment . . . is fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the public 
interest.”  Id. at 330 (alteration in original) (quoting Memorandum by Plaintiff Securities & Exchange 
Commission in Support of Proposed Settlement, supra note 38, at 5) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
137 Id. at 331–32. 
138 Id. at 332.  
139 Id. at 333. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 334. 
142 Id. at 333. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 330. 
146 Id. at 332. 
147 Id. at 335. 
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[were] . . . [then] the court [would] become[] a mere handmaiden to a 
settlement privately negotiated on the basis of unknown facts, while the 
public is deprived of ever knowing the truth in a matter of obvious public 
importance.”148  Having rejected the proposed agreement, Judge Rakoff 
decided to consolidate the CGMI case with the action against Brian Stoker 
and directed the parties to prepare for a trial date of July 16, 2012.149 
E.  The Appeal and Stoker Trial 
The SEC quickly reacted to this rejection by vehemently disagreeing 
with Judge Rakoff’s opinion and interpreting his rhetorical flourishes and 
desire for admitted facts as an order that it could no longer reach NAND 
settlements.  The SEC Division of Enforcement Director stated that the 
agency believed “the district court committed legal error by announcing a 
new and unprecedented standard . . . . in requiring an admission of facts—
or a trial—as a condition of approving a proposed consent judgment.”150  
In other statements, the SEC sought to justify its NAND settlements (e.g., 
how they avoid the risk of litigation and conserve budgetary resources) 
while also arguing that the monetary penalties would go to harmed 
investors.151  
Both the SEC and Citigroup filed appeals to Judge Rakoff’s 
decision.152  Following a hearing, a court of appeals merit panel filed a per 
curiam opinion on March 15, 2012, granting a permanent stay until another 
panel in the future could decide whether or not Judge Rakoff’s rejection of 
the consent judgment should be set aside.153  While this panel stated that 
“we are satisfied . . . that the S.E.C. and Citigroup have made a strong 
showing of likelihood of success in setting aside the district court’s 
rejection of their settlement,” they also noted that they had “not had the 
benefit of adversarial briefing.”154  As such, they added that “[t]he merits 
panel is, of course, free to resolve all issues without preclusive effect from 
this ruling.”155  On March 16, 2012, the court appointed John Wing, a 
                                                                                                                          
148 Id. at 332 (emphasis added). 
149 Id. at 335. 
150 Robert Khuzami, Director, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Div. of Enforcement, SEC 
Enforcement Director’s Statement on Citigroup Case (Dec. 15, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-265.htm. 
151 Robert Khuzami, Director, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Div. of Enforcement, Public Statement 
by SEC Staff: Court’s Refusal to Approve Settlement in Citigroup Case (Nov. 28, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch112811rk.htm; Khuzami, supra note 10. 
152 Citigroup Global Markets Inc.’s Memorandum in Support of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal, Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 
(No. 11 Civ. 7387); SEC’s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, 
Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (No. 11 Civ. 7387). 
153 SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 161 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam). 
154 Id. at 161, 169. 
155 Id. at 161. 
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former colleague of Judge Rakoff, to serve as pro bono counsel and 
advocate for the district court’s position.156 
During the summer of 2012, while the Citigroup appeal was pending, 
the Stoker case proceeded through discovery and trial.157  Through filed 
court documents in Stoker, the SEC revised the total losses by investors to 
$893 million, and finally revealed that CGMI’s gains from the CDO were 
$284 million—a figure much higher than the $160 million net profits 
provided in the CGMI filings.158  Also, in Mr. Stoker’s motion for 
summary judgment he “name[d] names” specifically identifying other 
CGMI individuals that he alleged were part of the Class V III deal.159  
Judge Rakoff rejected his motion, reasoning that just because Mr. Stoker 
was one of many people involved did not absolve him of liability for his 
actions.160  
Yet after a two-week trial in July 2012, a jury found Mr. Stoker not 
liable.161  Reportedly, his counsel gave an effective final argument utilizing 
the “Where’s Waldo?” defense, which is based on a children’s book that 
challenges readers to find the titular character.162  Mr. Stoker’s attorney 
argued that his client was just a small part of the CDO and that “[m]ost of 
[the] trial had nothing to do with Brian Stoker.”163  What this defense 
boiled down to was that even though Mr. Stoker participated in the grand 
scheme, he had limited authority and was being made a scapegoat for the 
company’s misconduct.164  
Jury comments afterward matched defense counsel’s conclusion.  One 
jury member stated “I’m not saying that Stoker was 100 percent innocent, 
but . . . . Stoker structured a deal that his bosses told him to structure, so 
                                                                                                                          
156 Jonathan Stempel, Rakoff Turns to Ex-Colleague for U.S. SEC-Citi Appeal, REUTERS (Mar. 16, 
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why didn’t they go after the higher-ups rather than a fall guy?”165  The jury 
foreman called CGMI’s actions “appalling” and added that “[t]his was not 
a verdict about Citi being absolved of any wrongdoing.”166  To back up this 
assertion, the jurors “did something extremely rare” and issued a statement 
in conjunction with their verdict.167  Judge Rakoff read aloud that statement 
in court saying “[t]his verdict should not deter the [SEC] from continuing 
to investigate the financial industry, review current regulations and modify 
existing regulations as necessary.”168  The SEC decided not to appeal the 
jury’s decision.169  
The Stoker resolution clearly affected the Citigroup appeal, as 
evidenced by the pro bono counsel’s brief in which he noted that thanks to 
the Stoker trial, “the district court has a substantial evidentiary record upon 
which to assess the proposed consent judgment on remand if the appeal is 
denied or dismissed.”170  However, before addressing pro bono counsel’s 
arguments further, both the SEC and CGMI had filed their principal briefs 
in May 2012 prior to the conclusion of the Stoker trial.171  Consistent with 
its prior statements, the SEC’s brief principally argued that Judge Rakoff 
was seeking to impose a “bright-line rule” preventing its ability to enter 
NAND consent decrees in the future and that this infringed on the 
independence of the agency.172  Among other issues, the SEC also argued 
that the $285 million settlement met the judicial review standard because it 
represented “more than 80% of what it could have reasonably expected to 
obtain if it prevailed at trial.”173  CGMI made many similar arguments in 
its briefs that echoed the SEC’s.174 
The pro bono counsel filed his only brief in August 2012,175 and he 
rejected the settling parties’ description of Judge Rakoff’s opinion.  
Centrally, he argued that “[t]he ruling did not state that the ‘proof’ or 
‘facts’ need[ed] to be tantamount to proof of liability–a term which easily 
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could have been employed had the court so intended.”176  Instead, he 
explained, Judge Rakoff could not approve the settlement because he “had 
not been provided with any ‘evidentiary basis,’ any ‘factual base,’ ‘any 
proven or acknowledged facts,’ or any other factual showing whatsoever 
on which to make the requisite determination.”177  The pro bono counsel 
argued that what the SEC actually presented was merely “a bare-bones and 
largely conclusory seven-page memorandum.”178  He also noted the 
conflict between the state of mind allegations as presented in the Citigroup 
and Stoker complaints (intentional conduct) and the actual charge made 
against CGMI (negligence), along with the lack of explanation for 
providing net profits instead of gross gain.179  He added that the parties 
could have provided the court with additional information similar to what 
was done for other cases.180  
Both the SEC and CGMI filed reply briefs in September 2012, in 
which each argued that the pro bono counsel incorrectly interpreted Judge 
Rakoff’s decision.181  The SEC argued again that the ruling “establishe[d] a 
bright-line rule that ha[d] no support in the law.”182  Similarly, CGMI 
asserted that Judge Rakoff’s opinion “was extreme and unprecedented.”183  
Oral arguments for the appeal were heard in February 2013, in which 
the parties’ arguments generally reflected what they presented in their 
briefs.  Notably the panel appeared to conclusively reject the SEC and 
CGMI argument that Judge Rakoff created a bright-line rule against 
NAND settlements as one of the judges on the panel described that issue as 
a “red herring.”184  As of February 2014, the panel has yet to issue an 
opinion.  The interest in this case has never abated as several other 
individuals or organizations, including former SEC Chairman Harvey 
Pitt,185 various securities law professors,186 and a group representing 
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Occupy Wall Street187 each submitted amicus briefs for the consideration 
of the appeal panel.  Additionally, the courtroom for the panel’s oral 
arguments was so overcrowded that more than fifty people had to watch it 
on closed-circuit television in another room.188  
Ultimately, the Citigroup case raises serious policy concerns about the 
current effectiveness of the U.S. securities enforcement structure and calls 
into question the proper roles and responsibilities of the SEC, the judiciary, 
and the public.  The remaining Parts of this Note will provide background 
for these various groups, explore major historical trends involving each, 
and analyze whether and how change is possible.   
III.  THE PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS IN SECURITIES LAW  
A.  Federal Regulatory Philosophy and the SEC Enforcement 
Organization 
To understand the proper level of deference owed to the SEC in cases 
like Citigroup, the agency’s current capabilities and limitations must first 
be recognized along with how they affect its decision-making process and, 
consequently, the interests of defendants and harmed investors.  Originally, 
the most significant developments in this regard were the passages of the 
Securities Act of 1933189 (the “Securities Act”), and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934190 (the “Exchange Act”), which created the SEC.191  
Unlike state regulators, who may actively judge the merits of or oversee 
the quality of a new securities offering through their “blue sky” statutes, 
the SEC model, embracing a full disclosure philosophy that does not 
approve or guarantee the soundness of the financial product, is more 
passive.192  This was by design, as President Roosevelt recommended 
passage of the Securities Act by emphasizing that it would “protect the 
public with the least possible interference to honest business.”193   
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The dominant rationale for disclosure is that providing all investors, 
large or small, with more comprehensive and accurate information will 
generate more informed and intelligent investment decisions that in turn 
will lead to more fairly priced products and, consequently, make price 
manipulation more difficult.194  The cornerstones of this approach are the 
Securities Act (referred to as the “truth-in-securities law”), which requires 
issuers to reveal the financial underpinnings of their securities products, 
and the Exchange Act, which compels registration of exchanges and 
broker-dealers along with other reporting provisions.195  While 
“[d]isclosures must not be misleading, either affirmatively or by half-truth 
or omission,”196 that edict alone cannot guarantee stable and efficient 
markets; policemen are needed to provide a backstop to punish violators 
and ensure all participants are following the rules.   
The SEC provides this watchdog function through its Division of 
Enforcement (DOE), which has arguably become its principal segment as 
exhibited by the agency today, openly describing itself as “[f]irst and 
foremost . . . a law enforcement agency.”197  The DOE is divided into five 
specialized units with a nationwide scope, which investigate and prosecute 
securities law violations across several subject areas such as foreign 
corrupt practices and municipal securities.198  Typical conduct investigated 
by the agency includes providing false or misleading information about 
securities, selling unregistered products, breaching fiduciary duties, and 
engaging in insider trading.199   
The SEC has enormous discretion to conduct investigations “as it 
deems necessary to determine whether any person has violated, is 
violating, or is about to violate” federal securities laws.200  Its powers are 
exercised by the DOE’s staff, which include attorneys, accountants, and 
other professionals.201  The SEC gains investigative leads from 
whistleblowers, the news media, auditors, self-regulatory organizations, 
and other financial industry sources.202  However, the agency usually lags 
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behind marketplace developments, and a former Commissioner described 
it as being “always in a reactive mode” rather than acting proactively.203 
There are two types of SEC investigations: informal and formal, with 
the former usually leading to the latter.204  An informal investigation 
involves examining brokerage records, reviewing trading data, and 
interviewing witnesses, while a formal type allows the agency to issue 
subpoenas that may compel testimony or document production.205  A 
typical SEC investigation begins informally by DOE staff,206 and formal 
investigation orders are issued at the discretion of the Division’s 
Director.207 
SEC enforcement actions are based on DOE recommendations, which 
are developed after months or years of building a comprehensive 
evidentiary record.208  The DOE substantiates its recommendations through 
“action memoranda” that lay out the factual and legal foundations for its 
cases, and which are presented for the consideration of the SEC 
Commissioners.209  The Commissioners decide at a formal meeting 
whether to bring violation charges, what type of actions to bring, the 
entities or persons to be named as defendants or respondents, and what 
relief to seek.210  They will also usually ask the staff’s opinion regarding 
the terms that might appropriately resolve a case in advance of their 
meeting.211 
Overall, the SEC seeks to ensure that “it has a sound basis for its 
allegations, and can meet statutory elements of the relief it is seeking.”212  
An action recommendation is approved by a majority vote so long as there 
is a quorum of three or more Commissioners.213  Most recommendations 
are approved.214  They can authorize staff to bring an administrative action, 
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file a case in federal court, or both.215  Except under extraordinary 
circumstances, the SEC Commissioners do not read or review complaints 
before they are filed for civil enforcement actions and instead delegate 
their construction to DOE staff.216 
Usually, the agency will announce an enforcement action by publicly 
distributing a litigation release.217  According to the SEC, the time it takes 
to start an investigation and ultimately resolve a case varies from one to 
three years for cases concluding in settlements, and two to four years for 
cases that go to trial (with another one to three years added to that if 
appealed).218  Generally, civil actions are subject to a five year statute of 
limitations.219 
B.  The SEC Enforcement Powers 
The type of action brought, whether civil or administrative, dictates the 
type of sanction or relief the SEC can seek.  In either setting, the agency 
can seek the return of illegal profits or the imposition of monetary 
penalties.220  While the administrative process has its own unique 
features,221 this Note will focus primarily on civil actions like the Citigroup 
case.  Exclusive to the civil course, the SEC can ask a federal district court 
to bar or suspend an individual from serving as a corporate officer or 
director, as well as for an injunction (i.e., a court order) to require certain 
supervisory arrangements or prohibit any further acts or practices that 
violate the law or the agency’s rules.222   
Injunctions have been the bedrock of the SEC’s enforcement program 
since the agency’s founding.223  The Securities Act empowers the agency 
to seek both temporary and permanent injunctive relief in federal court 
“[w]henever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged 
or about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will 
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constitute a violation.”224  The other major federal securities laws, 
including the Exchange Act, the Investment Company Act of 1940, and the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, each provide the SEC with similar 
authorization.225 
The Supreme Court has characterized injunctive relief as “a drastic 
remedy, not a mild prophylactic.”226  Despite that characterization, an 
injunction cannot provide direct punishment unless someone violates its 
terms, and arguably its most substantial effects are its ancillary 
consequences, as broker-dealers, investment advisers, and other 
participants in the securities industry may be suspended or barred based 
solely on the issuance of an injunction if the SEC decides to act through an 
administrative hearing.227  Typically the agency undertakes that course of 
action.228 
The SEC DOE Director has argued that injunctions “put the public on 
notice” about violations, and forces companies to establish, fund, and 
implement compliance programs to prevent future unlawful conduct.229  If 
a party breaches the terms of an agreement, then an injunction becomes 
“among the most formidable weapons” available to the courts.230  In this 
situation, the SEC does not have to do anything, and instead will expect a 
court to provide injunctive relief and enforce a contempt charge.231  Civil 
contempt requires a party to cease any ongoing violations of the 
injunction.232 
Beyond injunctive relief the SEC can impose two types of monetary 
sanctions: disgorgement and fines.  The first type deprives violators of 
their unjust enrichment and orders them to give up any ill-gotten gains 
acquired, including pre-judgment interest.233  Though the Exchange Act 
did not expressly provide for such relief, the courts in 1971 found the SEC 
had the authority to seek restitution and disgorgement through its ability to 
pursue injunctions.234   
The second type of monetary sanction, penalties and fines, has 
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expanded over time.  Before 1984, the entirety of the SEC’s civil penalty 
authority was found in a single provision of the Exchange Act that 
permitted a $100 per day penalty against issuers who failed to file certain 
statutorily required reports.235  But the passage of three statutes by 
Congress—namely, the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (“ITSA”),236 
the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 
(“ITSFEA”),237 and the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock 
Reform Act of 1990 (the “Remedies Act”)238—increasingly broadened the 
agency’s authority to seek damages or impose penalties.239   
Historically, the SEC did not distribute funds it recovered to harmed 
investors but the Remedies Act changed this by directing the agency to 
design rules so that it could do so.240  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(“Sarbanes-Oxley”),241 further developed this process by permitting the 
SEC to create “Fair Funds” accounts for injured investors whereby they 
can recover portions of any disgorgement or penalties received through an 
agency action.242  However, unless they were originally assigned to create 
a Fair Funds distribution plan, injured investors are only afforded the 
ability to comment on a proposed plan and cannot formally intervene or 
challenge it.243  Usually “[t]he amount of an investor’s claim is divided by 
the total amount of claims and then multiplied by available funds in the 
settlement.”244  Administrative costs of any distribution are subtracted from 
any amounts returned.245  If there are no harmed investors, or the amounts 
obtained are more than the harm caused, then the funds recovered are sent 
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to the U.S. Treasury,246 which was the required practice prior to the 
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley.247   
Taken all together, the SEC can presently penalize through two 
methods: first, through a per-violation calculation that is subject to certain 
caps, or second, through a calculation that allows for a fine equal to the 
“gross amount of the pecuniary gain” to the defendant “as a result of the 
violation.”248  The gross gain penalty is generally available only in federal 
courts.249  In practice, if a violator causes $10 million in investor harm 
while profiting by $2 million, the maximum amount the SEC could recover 
under this scheme would be $4 million (i.e., $2 million disgorging the 
profit and $2 million for a penalty equaling the gain).250 
It should be noted though that a SEC action involving disgorgement 
and penalty by gross gain does not necessarily need to be symmetrical.  In 
one recent case the SEC settled with Goldman Sachs for a disgorgement of 
$15 million coupled with a penalty of $535 million,251 and in another 
action involving Citigroup, the agency settled for disgorgement of only $1 
matched with a penalty of $75 million.252  Thus, just because the SEC can 
seek maximum recovery in any action does not necessarily mean that it 
actually does or will in the future.   
C.  The Basics Behind and Central Justifications for SEC Settlements 
Settlement is the civil analogue to criminal plea bargaining; “a truce 
more than a true reconciliation . . . [that] seems preferable to judgment 
because it rests on the consent of both parties and avoids the cost of a 
lengthy trial.”253  A SEC civil settlement typically involves three 
components: a complaint; a consent agreement by the settling party to a 
specified judicial decree; and a judgment embodying the agreed-upon 
relief.254  SEC consent decrees are publically accessible documents with 
injunctive provisions that must be stated in reasonable detail without 
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incorporating other documents by reference.255  They can be revised or 
dismissed by the court, even over the protestations of one of the parties.256  
In contrast, strictly private settlements may contain confidential terms that 
are not held to any requisite level of particularity, can incorporate other 
documents by reference, and cannot be changed by the courts without 
mutual consent.257 
The most significant distinction between a consent decree and a private 
settlement is that a consent decree requires judicial approval while a 
private settlement does not.258  This makes sense since injunctive relief 
functions as a request that a court be retained as the SEC’s “ongoing 
enforcement partner” that will issue contempt charges in the event of non-
compliance.259  “The Supreme Court has long endorsed the propriety of the 
use and entry of consent judgments.”260 
In deciding whether to settle, the DOE takes many factors into account, 
starting with proof, but its overall policy is that it will not recommend 
settlement unless an agreement “is within the range of outcomes [it] 
reasonably can expect if [it] litigate[d] through trial.”261  The agency’s 
settlements are negotiated outside of the public record and can be reached 
at any time during the enforcement process.262 
The SEC provides two central justifications for settlement, first being 
that it avoids the risks of unexpected outcomes that might arise from 
litigating a case.  The agency considers the possibility that it might not 
prevail at trial or that, even if it does prevail, a court might not grant all the 
relief sought; thus it could end up obtaining less than what may be offered 
in a proposed settlement.263  The SEC can and does lose at trial, and such 
losses, particularly for novel cases, can affect its enforcement in the 
future.264  By restraining itself to pursuing only winnable cases, the SEC 
can purportedly have a stronger bargaining position during settlements 
                                                                                                                          
255 Anthony DiSarro, Six Decrees of Separation: Settlement Agreements and Consent Orders in 
Federal Civil Litigation, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 277–78 (2010).  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
require all litigators, including those at the SEC, to sign any filed complaint and certify that they have a 
reasonable basis for its claims supported by evidence.  FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
256 DiSarro, supra note 255, at 278. 
257 Id. at 277–78. 
258 Macchiarola, supra note 23, at 72. 
259 Id. at 72–73. 
260 SEC v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing United States v. Armour & Co., 
402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971); Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 12 (1944); Swift & Co. v. United States, 
276 U.S. 311, 325–26 (1928)). 
261 Settlement Practices Hearing, supra note 12, at 75 (prepared statement of Robert Khuzami, 
Director, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Enforcement). 
262 Macchiarola, supra note 23, at 78.  
263 Settlement Practices Hearing, supra note 12, at 75 (prepared statement of Robert Khuzami, 
Director, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Enforcement). 
264 Johnson, supra note 210, at 672.  
 1142 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1111 
based on such a reputation.265  
The second major justification is that settlement conserves agency 
budgetary resources.  It is common knowledge that litigation is both 
resource and time intensive, and since trials often take longer to conclude 
than settlements, it follows that the SEC would be able to investigate fewer 
incidents if it focused exclusively on litigation.266  Settlements can preserve 
the SEC’s scarce monetary and human resources, allowing it to have a 
wider breadth of enforcement.267 
By comparison to the financial institutions that the SEC is charged 
with regulating, the agency is indisputably “under-funded and often legally 
outgunned” as banks can employ several Wall Street law firms while the 
agency’s annual budget is just a match for a single one of those firms.268  
During fiscal year 2012, the SEC possessed only 3,785 full-time 
employees,269 who collectively were responsible for regulating over 35,000 
entities.270  The DOE Director stated in 2011 that the agency could only 
inspect roughly eight percent of all investment advisers annually.271  
Events like the funding freeze of 2011, which resulted in hiring freezes and 
cut backs for activities such as travel for examiners, undoubtedly affected 
the agency’s ability to enforce the U.S. markets.272  Ultimately, the SEC 
does not have the staff or the funding to litigate every enforcement action, 
and so it instructs SEC attorneys to prioritize cases that have significant 
public policy ramifications in order to conserve resources.273  In 1973, at a 
time when the SEC brought fewer actions than it does today, the Second 
Circuit remarked that the agency could “bring the large number of 
enforcement actions it does only because in all but a few cases consent 
decrees are entered.”274   
On the whole, these two major defenses of settlement revolve around 
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money, which is largely an external force that the agency cannot fully 
control since the size of its annual budget is set by Congress.275  But the 
SEC does possess its own organizational and rule-making administrative 
powers,276 and while the basic responses to funding shortfalls outlined 
above are logical, it does not follow that the agency lacks any means or 
freedom in how it actually deals with those challenges.  Indeed, the root of 
the Citigroup controversy arguably was planted from internal changes that 
the SEC consciously and independently undertook in 1972 that continue to 
significantly affect its settlement practices and case resolution decision-
making to this day.   
D.  SEC Transformation  
The first major change in 1972 was the elevation of the DOE from a 
component within the SEC’s Division of Trading and Markets to its own 
divisional-entity.277  Second, the agency issued a release on September 27, 
1972, announcing it had decided to allow subjects under investigation an 
opportunity to present their positions before an enforcement 
authorization.278  The SEC “concluded that it would not be in the public 
interest to adopt formal rules” and decided that such a presentation would 
not be made a procedural right, but instead may be done on an “informal 
basis.”279  The agency published related new informal rules supporting this 
change in the Federal Register,280 and they are now part of the Code of 
Federal Regulations.281  The shorthand descriptions for the various items in 
this process are named after chairman John Wells, whose committee 
recommended its adoption (e.g., alerting an investigation subject is called a 
“Wells notice”).282 
The SEC’s enforcement manual sets out specific guidelines relating to 
Wells notices.  The timing of issuing such a notice varies according to the 
completeness of an investigation and if immediate enforcement action is 
necessary; but, more importantly, it depends on whether approval has been 
granted from an Associate or Regional Director.283  A Wells notice may 
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initially be given orally, but the SEC’s manual advises that it should be 
followed by a written statement outlining the specific charges being 
considered along with background and instructions setting out how a 
recipient may respond.284  After receiving the notice, an investigation 
target’s counsel can request a Wells meeting with staff to better understand 
the allegations.285  Staff has the discretion to allow subjects to review non-
privileged portions of its investigative file.286 
A written answer to a Wells notice is typically called a Wells 
submission.287  Counsel use it to convince SEC staff to absolve or decrease 
their client’s culpability or penalties by presenting mitigating 
circumstances and highlighting factual deficiencies in their case, or by 
sometimes offering a settlement.288  New facts are rarely introduced—
likely because respondents run the risk that their statements may be 
discoverable and admissible in subsequent litigation.289  While presenting 
their enforcement action recommendation to the Commissioners, SEC staff 
will include any Wells submission along with a staff response to it, which 
may include a position regarding any settlement offered.290 
The last major development arising out of 1972 concerns the 
codification of a practice that the SEC had adopted long before—allowing 
defendants to neither admit nor deny the allegations of a consent decree.291  
Since a denial from a defendant may lead to the false impression that 
alleged conduct in a consent decree did not occur, the SEC’s codified rule 
expressly prevents such denials and notes that “a refusal to admit the 
allegations is equivalent to a denial, unless the defendant or respondent 
states that he neither admits nor denies the allegations.”292  Nothing in the 
rule requires that a defendant must admit allegations of wrongdoing as part 
of a consent decree.  The agency’s November 27, 1972 publication in the 
Federal Register argued that this rule did not require public notice and 
comment before taking effect.293   
Evidently the SEC deemed it necessary to create this rule because 
immediately after entry of consent decrees, defendants would frequently 
engage in public campaigns denying the accusations and asserting that they 
agreed to settle simply to avoid the expenses of protracted litigation.294  
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Thus, the NAND rule represents a slight foundational enhancement to what 
was already a common practice.  If the SEC settles and allows a defendant 
to neither admit nor deny the allegations, boilerplate language referencing 
the agency’s rule is included in any consent judgments given to the 
courts.295  In the past, DOE staff have threatened to rescind agreements if 
any public denials are made, but the prompt issuance of retractions or 
corrective press releases have generally been successful in preventing that 
from actually happening.296   
Throughout the past decade the SEC has issued policy statements that 
supplement its original NAND rule.  In 2003, it announced that all consent 
injunction cases, including NAND, must have their allegations treated as 
virtually conclusive for purposes of later disciplinary (i.e., suspension, bar, 
or registration revocation) proceedings against the same individuals.297  
Additionally, in 2012, the SEC stated that it would not allow defendants 
who have already admitted guilt in parallel criminal proceedings from 
entering into a NAND SEC settlement.298  Importantly, while the rule and 
these policy changes curb public denials, defendants still possess the right 
to deny allegations in other civil court proceedings such as in lawsuits 
brought by harmed investors who may allege the same bad acts that were 
alleged by the SEC.299    
E.  Effects of the Agency’s Modifications for Defendants 
All in all, defense lawyers openly discuss the advantages of this 
enforcement set-up and strategize to their clients’ benefit accordingly.  
Defense attorneys describe the Wells process as “the most critical phase in 
an SEC investigation,”300 and note that “the best opportunity to influence 
the outcome of an SEC investigation often occurs during the staff’s 
investigation, rather than after its completion.”301  The Wells process can 
provide defendants a chance to review and comment on settlement 
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documents,302 which gives defense counsel an opportunity to shape the 
SEC’s conclusions and gain “substantial room” to negotiate the language 
used in the agency’s complaint so that it contains a more neutral retelling 
of the facts,303 and eliminates “some or all of a corporate defendant’s 
employees from the charges.”304  Consequently, “SEC settlements have 
long been ‘admired’ for their lack of factual basis.”305 
Similar to the SEC, defendants value settlement as a means to avoid 
risks associated with trial and to preserve time and resources (in terms of 
money and personnel) for business development rather than litigation.306  
An enforcement action alone generates negative publicity for an 
institution.307  Attempting to litigate a matter across several news cycles 
compounds the problem and thus is disfavored by comparison to a 
situation where a complaint and settlement can be filed on the same day.308  
Generally the market rewards settlements by raising the stock prices of a 
company for at least a few days afterward because the deals remove 
uncertainty.309 
Arguably above all else, defendants value NAND SEC settlements for 
removing the threat of collateral estoppel.  Historically, only the same 
parties in a particular case could collaterally estop the other in a subsequent 
suit.310  This changed following Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,311 when 
the Supreme Court approved its use by a class action group against a 
defendant who had an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate a prior action 
brought by the SEC.312  The agency acted as amicus curiae during that case 
and advocated for its final result.313  The takeaway from Parklane is that 
defendants’ liability to private plaintiffs is practically guaranteed if they 
lose an earlier SEC action that pertained to the same alleged illegal 
activity.314    
Settlements involving consent judgments generally do not have 
collateral estoppel consequences because the issues involved are not 
“actually litigated.”315  A consent judgment, however, may be conclusive if 
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the parties manifest their intention for it to be so.316  SEC NAND consent 
judgments lack this requisite intent and so courts do not give them 
preclusive effect.317   
Ultimately defendants’ motivation to settle on a NAND basis makes 
sense on a purely economic basis.  Defendants frequently face far greater 
potential monetary judgments from parallel private civil actions than from 
any SEC action.318  In one astonishing example, Bank of America agreed to 
a NAND settlement with the SEC for $150 million.319  Two years later, it 
agreed to settle a class action suit related to the same matter that was 
1520% more than the SEC amount ($2.43 billion)!320  Overall, it is 
incontestable that defendants greatly benefit from the enforcement and 
settlement process that the SEC has arranged.  
F.  Consequences of Changes on Private Suits by Harmed Investors 
As implied by earlier discussions, securities laws provide investors 
private causes of action to file certain civil suits individually or 
collectively, by a class action, against violators.321  For example, persons 
who purchase securities may recover for losses suffered if they can prove 
that an issuer disclosed incomplete or inaccurate material information.322  
Harmed investors attempting to use collateral estoppel bear the burden of 
introducing a sufficient record of the prior proceeding in order for the trial 
court to properly identify the issues already litigated.323 
In instances when private plaintiffs must present their own case 
without the benefit of collateral estoppel, it is important to first note certain 
actions undertaken by the courts and Congress that have made it more 
difficult for plaintiffs to get to trial.  Although the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure require pleadings to merely contain “a short and plain statement 
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,”324 the Supreme 
Court has held that plaintiffs must plead “factual content that allows the 
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged” in order to survive an opponent’s motion to 
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dismiss.325  To satisfy this heightened pleading standard, claims must have 
“facial plausibility” which “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 
defendant has acted unlawfully.”326  “Threadbare recitals of the elements of 
a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 
suffice.”327  “[P]laintiffs are not required to conform their pleadings to the 
rules of evidence,”328 however, and allegations are sufficient if they can 
“raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence.”329 
But further complicating matters for harmed investors are conditions 
imposed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(“PSLRA”),330 which discourages the filing of weak or frivolous 
lawsuits.331  It has been argued that the effect of PSLRA “leaves private 
enforcement of the federal securities laws in near terminal condition.”332  
Whereas under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allegations as to a 
defendant’s state of mind may usually be “alleged generally,”333 PSLRA 
imposes heightened pleading standards in actions brought under the 
Exchange Act’s antifraud provisions.  A private claimant must “state with 
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted 
with the required state of mind,”334 as well as “specify each statement 
alleged to have been misleading, [and] the reason or reasons why the 
statement is misleading.”335 
If the SEC becomes involved in a matter, private plaintiffs can attempt 
to guard their interests by moving to intervene in the agency’s enforcement 
actions.336  But as a policy, the agency opposes outside third parties from 
joining with its cases.337  However, plaintiffs can still benefit from the 
SEC’s actions in other ways.  For pleading purposes, plaintiffs may rely on 
inadmissible evidentiary sources “including: confidential witnesses, news 
articles, analyst reports, government hearing testimony (that was not 
subject to cross examination), bankruptcy examiner reports, and even 
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anonymous internet postings.”338  SEC complaints are similar to those 
items in that “there is no dispute that unadjudicated allegations are not 
evidence and cannot be used to prove facts in a subsequently-filed action, 
[but] such allegations may represent a source of factual information on 
which other plaintiffs may reasonably rely at the pleading stage when 
drafting their own complaints.”339 
Ultimately, though private plaintiffs cannot collaterally estop 
defendants merely by citing the content within government filings, the 
factual allegations contained within those documents can be used to 
provide foundational support in plaintiffs’ pleadings toward satisfying the 
requirement that they will be able to prove their claims using other 
admissible evidence following discovery.340  However, while plaintiffs 
may cite government consent decrees, such references do not automatically 
result in clearing the initial pleadings hurdle.  Though many courts have 
acknowledged “that specific factual allegations contained in a government 
pleading may be more reliable as a source of factual information than 
casual media reports,” there have been several instances when private 
plaintiffs cited SEC complaints and their cases failed to advance.341  Thus, 
when the SEC employs NAND settlements in cases like Citigroup, where 
Judge Rakoff bemoaned the lack of “proven or admitted facts,”342 the 
agency impairs the ability of private plaintiffs to proceed with their own 
cases. 
While the SEC today claims that it considers how its actions affect 
private claims—for instance, taking into account, when making a 
settlement determination, the fact that going to trial would delay the return 
of funds to harmed investors343—historically the agency did not consider 
such recoveries to be important.344  Also, recall that any funds collected by 
the SEC merely constitute disgorgement and penalties, and since the 
agency prevents joinder with its actions, compensatory damages to directly 
remedy investor losses cannot be awarded by a court.345  Consequently, if 
the agency truly worried about making investors whole, it might consider 
how a NAND settlement affects private actions, specifically in denying 
them the use of collateral estoppel.  The DOE Director recently testified to 
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Congress, however, that the SEC does not consider those consequences.346 
In defending the agency’s use of NAND, the SEC has argued that such 
agreements “are common not just across federal financial agencies, but 
across federal agencies more generally . . . . [i]n enforcing the securities, 
antitrust, environmental, consumer protection, public health, and civil 
rights laws.”347  At least two of those comparisons are disingenuous.  First, 
antitrust settlements are fundamentally different from the SEC process 
because they incorporate interests beyond the immediate parties (i.e., the 
agency and defendants).  Before a court can approve an antitrust consent 
judgment the parties are statutorily required to submit for judicial review a 
detailed assessment of the settlement’s impact on third parties in the 
general public.348  This competitive impact statement must include “the 
remedies available to potential private plaintiffs damaged by the alleged 
violation in the event that such proposal for the consent judgment is 
entered in such proceeding.”349  Additionally, any proposed judgment must 
be published in the Federal Register along with “any other materials and 
documents which the United States considered determinative in 
formulating such proposal,” allowing the public to comment for at least a 
period of sixty days before the judgment may be entered.350  Second, the 
environmental laws require publication of proposed settlements and 
provide thirty days for the public to comment before a judge can enter a 
consent decree.351  The SEC laws broadly discuss the “public interest” in 
several places,352 but impose no analogous requirements of providing 
notice to the public of settlements with opportunities to comment. 
In sum, the confluence of the current law, rules, and policy decisions 
have made investor loss recovery very difficult.  The status quo, which the 
SEC and defendants seem to prefer, is unfortunate because private lawsuits 
arguably could supplement the agency’s enforcement and help to deter 
future securities law violations.  The remaining Parts of this Note will 
explore whether and how the judiciary could bring about change to this 
existing system. 
                                                                                                                          
346 Settlement Practices Hearing, supra note 12, at 37 (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director, 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Enforcement). 
347 Id. at 75, 80–81 (prepared statement of Robert Khuzami, Director, U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, Division of Enforcement) (footnotes omitted). 
348 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (2012). 
349 Id. § 16(b)(4). 
350 Id. § 16(b). 
351 Dreilinger, supra note 265, at 23. 
352 E.g., Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(c)(1) (2012); Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2012). 
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IV.  ASSESSING THE USE AND UTILITY OF NAND SETTLEMENTS 
A.  The Role and Capabilities of the Judiciary 
Since the founding of the United States, federal judges have been 
valued for their impartiality.  Alexander Hamilton identified the courts as 
the “least dangerous” branch of government due to their detachment from 
the normal electoral processes.353  Yet, while the American appointment 
system affords federal judges a great amount of freedom, they would lack 
authority entirely if the public had not initially granted the judiciary power 
through the ratification of the Constitution.354 It is the public that sought 
and continues to expect to this day a government of divided powers and 
responsibilities.   
When the SEC asks the courts to become its enforcement partner by 
approving settlements in cases involving violations of securities laws and 
regulations, the public has a significant interest that the operations of the 
executive and the judiciary remain separate and independent.  If the courts 
merely rubber stamp a SEC consent judgment, they are not functioning in a 
constitutional manner.  This does not mean that the courts should outright 
ban NAND agreements simply because they undermine private suits; to do 
so would usurp the independence of the SEC.  Instead the proper response, 
as Judge Rakoff indicated in his Citigroup opinion, is to demand factually 
credible and supported complaints so that the courts can properly fulfill 
their role and conduct a neutral assessment of whether or not proposed 
settlements are fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the public interest.355 
It is generally accepted that an agency’s decision whether and what to 
prosecute is within its discretion and usually not reviewable.356  The 
reasoning behind this conclusion is that since an agency conducted the 
necessary investigation before filing charges and proposing a consent 
judgment, it will generally have more prosecutorial expertise and access to 
information than a court at the start of proceedings, and as such, judges 
should provide agencies some deference for deciding to negotiate a 
                                                                                                                          
353 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
354 As Chief Justice Marshall once wrote, “The government proceeds directly from the people; 
[and it] is ‘ordained and established,’ in the name of the people.”  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 
(4 Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819).  In addition, before taking office every judge must take a statutory oath of 
office swearing to “support and defend the Constitution.”  ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
GETTING STARTED AS A FEDERAL JUDGE: AN ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDE TO ASSIST NEW JUDGES 
DURING THEIR FIRST YEAR ON THE BENCH 13–14 (2d ed. 2005). 
355 SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 331–32 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
356 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“[A]n agency’s decision not to prosecute or 
enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s 
absolute discretion.”). 
 1152 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1111 
settlement.357  However, judges “can employ a number of measures to 
lessen the impact of distributional inequalities.”358  These measures include 
asking questions to supplement the parties’ presentation, calling their own 
witnesses, and allowing outside parties to participate as amici.359     
A judge’s role and participation in a settlement case will typically be 
less than in one that goes to trial.  Congress has established a strong public 
policy encouraging settlement by requiring district courts to implement 
plans that “ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of civil 
disputes.”360  For settlements, there is usually not much reason for a judge 
to get heavily involved if the parties have reached a mutual agreement, and 
courts are generally happy to embrace them for helping to clear their busy 
dockets.361  Settlements that contain admissions of guilt have added 
benefits for the courts, as collateral estoppel contributes to the conservation 
of judicial resources by allowing courts to avoid re-litigating already 
resolved issues.362   
The courts have imposed certain common standards for reviewing and 
approving injunctive relief.  First, a prosecuting agency must prove a 
defendant has violated the law and second, that he is likely to violate it 
again in the future unless enjoined.363  The agency must show that the 
threat of a future violation reasonably exists, and the courts assess this by 
looking at the totality of the circumstances including the historical profile 
of the defendant.364  Also among the factors that should be considered is 
“the connection between the settlement and any related pending or 
prospective criminal or civil cases.”365  Additionally, simply because 
violative activity has ceased does not preclude a court from granting an 
injunction.366   
Assessing a case requires certain facts, and the general guideline from 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is that “[e]very order granting an 
injunction . . . must: (A) state the reasons why it issued; (B) state its terms 
specifically; and (C) describe in reasonable detail—and not by referring to 
the complaint or other document—the act or acts restrained or required.”367  
Along these lines courts have stated that “[b]ecause a consent judgment 
has a continuing [e]ffect on the rights of litigants, courts are required to 
                                                                                                                          
357 M. Todd Henderson, Impact of the Rakoff Ruling: Was the Judge’s Scuttling of the SEC/BofA 
Settlement Legally Pointless or Incredibly Important—or Both?, WALL ST. LAW., Nov. 2009, at 5.  
358 Fiss, supra note 253, at 1077. 
359 Id. 
360 Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 471 (2012). 
361 Johnson, supra note 210, at 651.  
362 Id. at 666.  
363 Ochs et al., supra note 45, at 187. 
364 Ferrara & Khinda, supra note 296, at 1175–76. 
365 United States v. Peterson, 859 F. Supp. 2d 477, 478 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). 
366 Ferrara & Khinda, supra note 296, at 1176. 
367 FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(1). 
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ascertain whether the parties agreement ‘represents a reasonable factual 
and legal determination based on the facts of the record.’”368  To gain the 
requisite knowledge, a judge may conduct oral hearings and request 
additional briefing.369 
B.  Development of Judicial Review for Securities Settlements 
In concert with the basic tenant of reasonableness, courts over the 
years have settled on a few additional terms to their standards of review for 
assessing approval of SEC settlements: whether such agreements would 
also be fair, adequate, and in the public interest.370  The four elements of 
this test were arguably not consecutively combined until recently, but the 
roots of it arose from SEC v. Randolph,371 in which the Ninth Circuit stated 
that “[u]nless a consent decree is unfair, inadequate, or unreasonable, it 
ought to be approved.”372  At issue in that case was whether the district 
court correctly rejected a proposed NAND consent decree.373   
The district court believed, because of the similarity in the purposes 
behind an antitrust law and the securities laws, that it needed to review 
whether the settlement was also in the “public’s best interest.”374  While 
the Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court for going too 
far by using a “best interest” standard,375 it wrote that “[w]e do not 
question the appropriateness of a requirement that the decree be in the 
public interest.”376  The Supreme Court has never directly commented on 
whether courts must consider the public interest in the context of 
approving consent decrees.  But on two occasions in the past decade the 
Court has required plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief to establish that such 
an action was in the public interest.377 
                                                                                                                          
368 Bayou Fleet, Inc. v. Alexander, 234 F.3d 852, 858 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. 
City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Rubin, J., concurring)). 
369 FED. R. CIV. P. 78; see also Letter from Rudolf T. Randa, U.S. District Judge, to Andrea R. 
Wood & James A. Davidson, Counsel (Dec. 20, 2011), available at http://www.wlrk.com/docs/Kosslett
er.pdf (requesting the SEC “provide a written factual predicate” to permit the court to assess the 
proposed settlement). 
370 E.g., SEC v. CR Intrinsic Investors, LLC, No. 12 CIV. 8466 (VM), 2013 WL 1614999, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2013); SEC v. Cioffi, 868 F. Supp. 2d 65, 72 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). 
371 736 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1984). 
372 Id. at 529.  
373 Id. at 527–28; see also SEC. v. Randolph, 564 F. Supp. 137, 139 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (noting that 
the defendants agreed to the consent decree “without conceding liability”), rev’d, 736 F.2d 525 (9th 
Cir. 1984). 
374 Randolph, 736 F.2d at 529. 
375 Id. at 529–30. 
376 Id. at 529. 
377 See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (“A plaintiff seeking a 
preliminary injunction must establish . . . that an injunction is in the public interest.”); eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (“According to well-established principles of equity, 
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Despite this evolution in review standards, “[i]t is extremely rare for a 
federal court to reject an SEC proposed settlement of an enforcement 
action.”378  Going against the trend, Judge Rakoff has openly challenged 
several SEC settlements presented to him when their structure or factual 
basis failed to meet the accepted standard of review.  First, in SEC v. Bank 
of America Corp.,379 the SEC originally presented Judge Rakoff with a 
proposed NAND consent judgment requesting to enjoin the bank and 
impose a $33 million fine.380  The case related to the company’s 
acquisition of Merrill Lynch and involved charges that Bank of America 
lied to shareholders in its proxy statement that it would not pay $5.8 billion 
in bonuses to Merrill executives.381  Second, in SEC v. Vitesse 
Semiconductor Corp.,382 the SEC provided several NAND consent 
judgments, one against the company and two against individuals, 
containing various monetary penalties and either enjoinments or bars 
concerning future activity.383  The case involved several allegations of 
fraud occurring from 1995 to 2006, including the failure to record about 
$184 million in compensation expenses.384 
In each instance Judge Rakoff asked for a hearing and additional 
materials.385  While considering each action, he noted the deference owed 
to the SEC386 and that the final standard of review in each case was 
whether the settlement was “fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the public 
interest.”387  In Bank of America, without discussing the scope of review 
concerning the public interest, Judge Rakoff assessed the facts behind the 
proposed settlement and rejected it, concluding that “the proposed Consent 
Judgment [was] neither fair, nor reasonable, nor adequate.”388  The parties 
responded by presenting the court with “a 35-page Statement of Facts and 
                                                                                                                          
a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy . . . that the public interest would not be 
disserved by a permanent injunction.”). 
378 Brief of Better Markets, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Pro Bono Counsel Appointed to 
Advocate for Affirmance of the District Court’s Order, supra note 157, at 3 n.3. 
379 653 F. Supp. 2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
380 Id. at 508. 
381 Id. 
382 771 F. Supp. 2d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
383 Id. at 305, 307. 
384 Id. at 305, 306. 
385 Id. at 306; Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d at 508. 
386 Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d at 306–07; SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., Nos. 09 
Civ. 6829 (JSR), 10 Civ. 0215 (JSR), 2010 WL 624581, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010); Bank of Am. 
Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d at 508.  
387 Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d at 306–07; Bank of Am. Corp., 2010 WL 
624581, at *3.  Judge Rakoff phrased the standard slightly differently in his original Bank of America 
decision.  See Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d at 508 (“[T]he court is . . . obliged . . . to ascertain 
whether [the proposal] is within the bounds of fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy—and, in certain 
circumstances, whether it serves the public interest.”). 
388 Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d at 509.  
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a 13-page Supplemental Statement of Facts” along with “hundreds of 
pages of deposition testimony and other evidentiary materials bearing on 
the case” which Bank of America did not contest the accuracy of but 
refused to concede on their materiality.389  Additionally the parties 
presented a modified consent decree that added new prophylactic 
measures, created a Fair Fund for harmed Bank of America shareholders, 
and increased the fine to $150 million.390  Though Judge Rakoff bemoaned 
that the fine was “paltry” and that the result would be “half-baked justice at 
best,” he ultimately approved this new consent judgment, noting that it was 
“premised on a much better developed statement of the underlying facts 
and inferences drawn therefrom.”391 
In Vitesse, Judge Rakoff argued that the SEC’s NAND rule creates a 
“stew of confusion and hypocrisy,” making it difficult for the public to 
discern the truth behind the agency’s actions.392  Unlike in Bank of 
America though, Judge Rakoff was ultimately satisfied that the original 
supplemental materials allowed the parties to meet the aforementioned 
standard.393  Through the extra materials, he learned that though the 
individual defendants were neither admitting nor denying the SEC’s civil 
complaint, they had pleaded guilty to parallel criminal charges.394  Despite 
the small $3 million fine, Judge Rakoff believed it to be adequate after 
considering that the company already committed to providing $2.4 million 
to a parallel class action suit, and both figures were less than the net cash 
flow Vitesse took in that year ($1.5 million).395  In several ways, these two 
cases laid the groundwork for the Citigroup case. 
C. Surveying the SEC’s Reliance on and Effectiveness with NAND 
Settlements 
Underlying Judge Rakoff’s critiques of the SEC’s actions is a sense 
that the agency uses its ability to reach NAND settlements as a shield to 
avoid closer scrutiny of its policy choices and overall performance.  
Although this Note agrees with the SEC that there are obvious case 
resolution efficiencies and worthwhile resource preservation in settling, it 
concludes that Judge Rakoff is correct to question the agency’s motives 
and actions.  A brief look at some of the agency’s recent enforcement 
                                                                                                                          
389 Bank of Am. Corp., 2010 WL 624581, at *1. 
390 Id. at *3–5. 
391 Id. at *4–6. 
392 Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d at 308–09.  
393 Id. at 306, 308. 
394 Id. at 307.  Notably, today those defendants would not have been allowed to enter into NAND 
consent decrees.  See supra text accompanying note 298 (noting that the SEC does not allow 
“defendants who have already admitted guilt in parallel criminal proceedings from entering into a 
NAND SEC settlement”). 
395 Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d at 307, 310. 
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statistics demonstrates that the agency has struggled to win cases at trial 
and has adopted settlement as its default enforcement resolution.   
For example, during the fiscal years 2010–2012, the agency brought an 
average of about 717 enforcement actions a year,396 with 95% (roughly 
685) of those cases ending through settlement.397  By comparison, other 
agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission and Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission resolved their cases through settlement only 80% 
of the time.398  The total number of SEC settlements through fiscal years 
2003–2012 averaged about 726 annually.399  By contrast, the agency 
brought no more than fifteen to twenty cases a year to trial in federal 
court.400  The SEC claims it won between 82 and 86% of its trials during 
2011 and 2012, but some commentators contend that the agency only wins 
about half of its trials.401  Either figure is less than the Department of 
Justice’s success rate of 90%.402 
As to the effectiveness of its enforcement, the SEC has exhibited 
difficulty in reacting to recidivists.  Despite the presence of injunctions, 
from 1996 to 2011 the largest Wall Street firms (including Bank of 
America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, and JP Morgan Chase) collectively 
repeated prior violations of anti-fraud securities laws at least fifty-one 
times.403  These companies were allowed second chances to break the law 
because the SEC granted at least 344 waivers during 2001–2011 to allow 
those companies and their employees to continue their businesses.404 
While the SEC has argued that NAND settlements “serve the critical 
enforcement goals of accountability, deterrence, investor protection, and 
                                                                                                                          
396 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2012 AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT 2 (2012) 
(announcing 734 enforcement actions); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FY 2011 PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2 (2011) (announcing 735 enforcement actions); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, FY 2010 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 11 (2010) (announcing 681 
enforcement actions). 
397 See JORGE BAEZ ET AL., NERA ECON. CONSULTING, SEC SETTLEMENT                                 
TRENDS: 2H12 UPDATE 5 (2013), available at http://www.nera.com/nera-
files/PUB_SEC_Trends_Update_2H12_0113_final.pdf (tallying 670 settlements in fiscal year 2010, 
another 670 in 2011, and 714 in 2012). 
398 Settlement Practices Hearing, supra note 12, at 76–77 (prepared statement of Robert Khuzami, 
Director, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Enforcement). 
399 See BAEZ ET AL., supra note 397, at 5 (recording the total number of settlements for each year 
during this period). 
400 N.Y. CITY BAR ASSOC. COMM. ON SEC. LITIG., SEC V CITIGROUP 2 (2012), available at 
http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072297-SECv.Citigroup.pdf. 
401 Alison Frankel, The Stoker Verdict and the Citi Settlement, THOMPSON REUTERS (Aug. 2, 
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/02/us-citigroup-stoker-idUSBRE8711WL20120802. 
402 Alison Frankel, No Easy Solution to Rakoff’s Challenge to SEC Settlements, THOMPSON 
REUTERS (Nov. 3, 2011), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2011/11_-
_November/No_easy_solution_to_Rakoff_s_challenge_to_SEC_settlements. 
403 Wyatt, supra note 83. 
404 Giving Wall Street a Break, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2
012/02/02/business/Giving-Wall-Street-a-Break.html?ref=business. 
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compensation to harmed investors,”405 this Note argues that such 
settlements fail at all four levels.  There cannot be true accountability if 
defendants do not admit to liability.  NAND settlements have generated 
little, if any, positive deterrent effect as evidenced by the recent financial 
calamities outlined in Part I, and by the number of repeat offenders as 
detailed above.  Additionally, they largely protect violators from harmed 
investors rather than the other way around.  Finally, investors can be only 
partially compensated because, as discussed in Part III, the agency has a 
policy against joinder, and the SEC alone does not have the power to 
recover investor losses. 
At the most basic level, NAND settlements are paradoxical.  Why 
would someone agree to be restrained if they refuse to admit any 
wrongdoing?  Along those lines, how can the SEC credibly argue that it 
“settle[s] cases for the right reasons,” while at the same time admit that 
“many companies would refuse to settle cases if they [were] required to 
admit unlawful conduct.”406 
In truth, corporate defense lawyers are much more afraid of lawsuits 
initiated by private investors than they are of SEC actions.  This fact is 
manifested by companies’ preference for NAND settlements.  Through the 
Wells process, counsel can barter what their clients generally regard as 
mere monetary pittances to avoid their client admitting liability and to 
water down the factual clarity of the SEC’s complaints.  Most frustrating 
of all is that the SEC recognizes this desire and, all too commonly, gives 
away the NAND bargaining chip.  The SEC’s current co-director of the 
DOE recently commented that “[a]s a defense lawyer, I always clearly 
wanted from [sic] my clients no admit and no deny settlements.”407   
On a strictly case-by-case basis, the argument for settling—to avoid 
litigation risks and conserve resources—is strong.  However, when viewed 
in the aggregate, such decisions appear less thoughtful and deliberate, and 
instead demonstrate routine and predictable behavior.  It is true that 
settlement frees up the SEC’s staff to investigate and bring more cases.  
But if the SEC’s opponents know and expect that it will settle, then the 
agency has lost a significant amount of negotiating power when it comes to 
drafting settlement agreements and this leads to the creation of factually 
diluted court filings and a reduction in the penalties imposed against 
defendants.  One commentator made an apt observation that “[w]hen it 
complains, even legitimately, about its budget or how costly and difficult 
trials are, the S.E.C. is inadvertently showing its belly to Wall Street in a 
                                                                                                                          
405 Settlement Practices Hearing, supra note 12, at 75 (prepared statement of Robert Khuzami, 
Director, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Enforcement). 
406 Khuzami, supra note 10. 
407 SEC’s Andrew Ceresney Defends Neither Admit nor Deny Settlements, supra note 299. 
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sign of submission.”408 
Not surprisingly, the agency’s overall performance and clear 
overreliance on settlement has drawn widespread public criticism, and its 
thinly supported complaints and consent decrees have garnered 
admonishment from the federal courts.  The agency has tried to defend 
itself by repeatedly presenting certain straightforward figures in its annual 
reports, such as the number of actions brought and amount of money 
recovered, to provide a counterargument that in fact its enforcement is 
robust and substantial.409  The DOE Director once framed the agency’s 
performance by comparing its 2010 and 2011 combined budgets of $2.3 
billion against a total penalty recovery of $5.6 billion during that period as 
delivering a return on investment that “[v]ery few companies can claim.”410   
While such figures may sound impressive on their own, the exorbitant 
recovery figures could demonstrate an insecure market just as much as a 
tightly regulated one.  Working in favor of the former argument is the fact 
that the SEC has been able to accumulate larger collections simply because 
the legal reforms during the past twenty years have facilitated it.  In 
support of this contention, in 2009 alone, the agency distributed $2.1 
billion, which was twice as much as it had collected between 1984 and 
1992 all together.411  Notably the largest penalty the SEC had ever obtained 
up until the 2002 passage of Sarbanes-Oxley was just $10 million.412 
Beyond monetary penalties, the agency could do more concerning 
recidivists, but it has not.  Recall Citigroup’s repeated violations presented 
in Part II.B and the fact that the SEC did not present those charges in any 
detail during the Citigroup case.  Michigan Senator Carl Levin 
appropriately commented that the SEC’s settlement practices are “like a 
cop giving out warnings instead of giving tickets . . . . [i]t’s a green light to 
operate the same way without a lot of fear that the boom is going to be 
lowered on you.”413 
In a welcome new development, SEC Chairman Mary Jo White 
announced in June 2013 that the SEC would require an admission of guilt 
for certain cases in the future.414  However, as of February 2014, the 
agency has neither published new rules to effectuate such a policy change, 
nor eliminated the NAND rule.  Based on the SEC’s decades-long track 
                                                                                                                          
408 Jesse Eisinger, Needed: A Cure for a Severe Case of Trialphobia, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 14, 
2011), http://www.propublica.org/thetrade/item/needed-a-cure-for-a-severe-case-of-trialphobia. 
409 E.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2012 AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT, supra 
note 396, at 2. 
410 Khuzami, supra note 10. 
411 Zimmerman, supra note 234, at 52930.  
412 MacDonald, supra note 11, at 425.   
413 Wyatt, supra note 83. 
414 Jenna Greene, At the SEC, No Admit, No Deny Lives On, BLOG LEGAL TIMES (Sept. 17, 2013, 
3:21 PM), http://legaltI chaimes.typepad.com/blt/2013/09/at-the-sec-no-admit-no-deny-lives-on.html. 
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record, the public should not put too much faith in the notion that the SEC 
has permanently changed without evidence of more substantive steps or 
regular denial of NAND agreements. 
V.  A WAY FORWARD THROUGH THE JUDICIARY 
This Note has examined how NAND settlements afford violators of 
securities laws two great benefits: the opportunity to shroud their illegal 
actions from the public and time to delay the completion of private actions 
filed by harmed investors.  To remedy the ineffectiveness of the current 
enforcement system, this Note contends that judges should be the engine 
for introducing much needed change.  The vehicle for change, as Judge 
Rakoff surveyed in the Citigroup case, is the application of a public 
interest component when courts review SEC requests for injunctive relief.   
While the SEC has argued that it is most capable of assessing the 
public interest,415 courts should not automatically defer to the agency.  
Though the SEC is tasked with protecting investors and the markets in a 
broad way that arguably encompasses the entire public, its enforcement 
powers do not fully align with the scope of its mission.  Because it cannot 
fully recover harmed investors’ losses,416 it cannot provide complete 
protection for them.  Thus the U.S. securities enforcement system is 
splintered between two segments: public and private enforcement.  Judges 
must not ignore this important fact. 
Though the advent of Fair Funds may increase the agency’s support for 
the interests of harmed investors, the SEC arguably puts its self-interest 
above those of all outside parties when it determines whether to reach a 
NAND settlement.  It does not adequately consider the cost to specifically 
harmed investors (and indirectly to the public at large) of failing to require 
defendants to admit liability so they can be collaterally estopped from 
arguing their innocence in civil court.  The SEC in the past has made a 
duplicitous argument that harmed investors are better served by a quick 
settlement rather than waiting longer for results from a trial.417  Framing 
settlements as something that harmed investors desire hides the ignoble 
fact that the agency controls the process and prefers to settle for the myriad 
internal reasons discussed earlier.  Ultimately, by using NAND agreements 
that weaken private investor suits, the SEC makes it more difficult to 
accomplish its principal purpose of maintaining fair and transparent 
security exchanges.  It undermines the opportunity for private suits to 
                                                                                                                          
415 See Brief of the Securities & Exchange Commission, Appellant/Petitioner, supra note 171, at 
19 (“The district court did not defer to the Commission’s decision . . . . [which] reflected the 
Commission’s judgment that settlement best served the public interest . . . .”). 
416 See supra Part III.B. 
417 E.g., Khuzami, supra note 10; SEC’s Andrew Ceresney Defends Neither Admit nor Deny 
Settlements, supra note 299. 
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provide added accountability and deterrence. 
Admittedly the SEC’s job is difficult, but it does not follow that its 
policy decisions cannot be questioned by other branches of government or 
the public.  While pushing for more admissions of guilt should be 
complimented, regardless of what the SEC may do going forward, the 
judiciary must fulfill its obligations of providing meaningful review that 
acknowledges the agency’s biases.  When dealing with cases involving 
government action, the judiciary has a duty to consider the entire public 
interest in a much broader sense than the narrow interests of any parties 
that come before it.   
To meet that duty this Note argues that the current four-element 
standard of review should be fleshed out to assist judges in their 
evaluations as well as set clear expectations for settling parties (i.e., the 
SEC and defendants).  Toward establishing this new framework, the 
lessons surrounding the Bank of America, Vitesse, and Citigroup cases are 
incorporated.  Centrally, Judge Rakoff’s exhortation in Citigroup of 
needing “proven or admitted facts” is a fundamental component.418  Such 
facts do not dictate admitting liability but merely demonstrate that there is 
sufficient proof for a judge to determine that the settlement satisfies all 
four elements of the standard of review.     
Proceeding through each part of the standard of review, I argue that 
judges should first analyze a consent decree against the public interest.  To 
begin, if any third parties have been harmed by the alleged violations, this 
should be acknowledged in the SEC filings because it will affect the next 
steps of analysis.  Courts should segregate cases where defendants admit 
fault from others where they do not.  When liability is conceded, the public 
interest is generally satisfied.  However, as is the case for NAND 
settlements, more careful scrutiny under the remaining three elements will 
be needed to sufficiently account for the public being denied clear 
accountability and the fact that the courts and harmed investors will likely 
have to undertake longer private litigation as a result.  Such an imposition 
can be weighed against whether the SEC has committed to making a Fair 
Fund available to provide restitution. 
The next element, concerning whether a settlement is fair, is relatively 
narrow and focuses on whether the agreement was fairly reached between 
the parties involved.  Specifically, the inquiry under this element is 
whether the agreement was completed by an arm’s length negotiation and 
whether each party consented to the agreement without coercion.  The 
terms of the settlement should be clear and unambiguous to any defendants 
or outside observers.    
The third element calls on a judge to analyze the charges and the proof 
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provided to determine whether they are reasonable.  The most basic 
inquiry is whether the agency and the court have the authority to impose 
the terms set out in the consent decree.  For instance, it would be 
unreasonable for the SEC to charge a defendant for violating an 
environmental statute if the power to do so had not been delegated to the 
agency.  On a more substantive level though, a judge must assess whether 
the SEC has provided a satisfactory factual basis that is sufficiently 
consistent with the legal requirements for the violations asserted.   
The court should not reject a consent decree on a basis that the SEC 
could or should have charged a defendant under a different law.  This 
would interfere with the executive branch’s independence in deciding how 
it proceeds with a case and would ignore the fact that each side in a 
negotiation will logically tend to give up something in return for an 
agreement.  However, as Judge Rakoff did in Bank of America, Vitesse, 
and Citigroup, courts should compare any complaint against parallel civil 
or criminal proceedings to ensure that the facts presented are consistent 
across each.419  Courts may dismiss an agreement if there are significant 
ambiguities, material gaps, or inconsistencies that would prevent it from 
undertaking a meaningful review.  This was the case in Citigroup, where 
there were questions concerning the mental state of CGMI’s actions and 
the gross gain achieved.420 
The final element, adequacy, is arguably the most complex part of a 
court’s review and requires significant factual support.  When third parties 
in the public have been harmed by a violation, the courts should assess 
NAND settlements differently from non-NAND ones.  Since NAND 
agreements prevent collateral estoppel, judges should compare the 
adequacy of a settlement’s terms against both the defendant’s gross gain 
and any purported losses by injured investors.  Thus, it should be a 
prerequisite that the parties to a NAND settlement provide the courts with 
those two amounts as well as the means to adequately explain and 
substantiate how the parties arrived at their figures.  By contrast, a non-
NAND settlement should not consider investor losses because those 
persons would benefit from the liability admission.  The mix of any 
financial penalty, between the amount of fines and disgorgement, should 
be largely immaterial since both are combined for Fair Fund purposes.   
Unfortunately, an exact equation for measuring a settlement’s 
adequacy cannot be formulated—but certain variables can be used to assist 
judges in their determinations.  Centrally, the quality of detail presented in 
the parties’ filings should carry significant weight because any and all facts 
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outlined could benefit the private claims of harmed investors and, most 
importantly, could provide warnings and transparency to the general public 
and the courts about who specifically committed the alleged illegal 
activities and how.  There may be instances where a $285 million NAND 
agreement reached to settle almost $1.2 billion in combined gross gains 
and investor losses should be ruled inadequate because of the poor quality 
of the facts supporting it.  But another NAND settlement for just $150 
million against $5.8 billion in total gross gains and investor losses could be 
ruled adequate due to the unambiguousness of the evidence presented.  
Alternatively, a third NAND settlement for $298 million to resolve $300 in 
combined gross gains and investor losses could be adequate even with 
minimal factual support because of how close the remedy financially 
covers the harm caused.  Finally, a non-NAND settlement for $15 million 
against $400 million in total gross gains and investor losses sustained by a 
minimum number of facts could be adequate because of the admission of 
guilt.     
Toward assessing the adequacy of a financial penalty against the facts 
presented, penalties should not be judged by how easily a company might 
be able to cover any monetary penalties.  Cases like Vitesse, however, 
where a defendant company is constrained by the amount it could pay 
back,421 may change the analysis due to that type of extenuating 
circumstance.  Yet a judge should analyze the size and scope of a 
settlement against a defendant’s past behavior comparing relevant past 
penalties imposed on that same individual or entity (regardless if the 
parties identify such penalties in the present filings or not).  Judges may be 
tempted to, but they should not compare penalties that were previously 
imposed on another party against the company or individual that is 
presently before it (e.g., comparing Bank of America against Citigroup) 
because it is different to compare past settlements made involving the same 
company versus settlements made with another that entail distinct facts and 
players. 
Lastly, as it relates to the injunction component of consent decrees, 
judges should be notified if the defendant individual or company has been 
or is subject to any relevant post-violation compliance procedures.  Judges 
should evaluate the effectiveness of those past measures and insure that 
adequate supervision or new procedures will be established to prevent 
future violations. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In the present era of economic instability, private securities actions 
could play a crucial, complementary role in providing accountability and 
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deterring illegal activities in the markets, and the courts should give this 
more consideration in their standard of review.  Judges can effectively 
make sure that the public interest is being considered even if the SEC 
falters at times in its enforcement.  This Note’s proposed course of review 
does not allow judges to insert themselves in crafting the scope of SEC 
settlements, but instead simply pushes the agency to be clearer in how it 
has developed them.   
The agency should not be burdened by this type of judicial review.  As 
outlined in Part III.A, considering the time spent investigating cases as 
well as the level of internal review, it is safe to assume that if the SEC 
presents a court with an enforcement action, then it has, at the very least, 
built a robust evidentiary record that it could deploy if needed.  There is no 
good reason why the agency could not provide other types of materials 
such as “a verified complaint, an SEC affidavit, a joint statement of facts, 
record evidence like depositions or documents, a 21(a) report of 
investigation from the SEC, or any number of other ways”422 if it were 
asked by a court for additional information beyond its initial filings.   
Defendants may benefit less from this proposal, but this may not be an 
undesirable result.  In agreeing to NAND settlements, violators of 
securities laws have already earned a tremendous litigation asset by 
denying harmed investors the option of collateral estoppel, but it is curious 
why it would be in the public interest for them to double their benefits by 
profiting from factually diluted government filings that make it harder for 
private claims to be brought against them.  Though private plaintiffs would 
benefit from clearer submissions, government allegations would merely 
advance harmed investors to the next stage of litigation and would not 
guarantee victory to them or leave settling violators defenseless.  Private 
claimants would still need to prove their allegations based on admissible 
evidence. 
This proposed framework will lead to a more transparent and balanced 
system.  It should allow continued SEC discretion in determining how it 
resolves its investigations, provide courts more sufficient information to 
fulfill its review responsibilities, and offer greater resources to the public to 
identify, understand, and possibly assist in deterring bad actors from 
committing future violations.  If the SEC presents Citigroup-like 
settlements in the future, courts should follow the example set by Judge 
Rakoff by giving the agency an opportunity to provide further information, 
and, in the absence of any substantial updates, can reject them if they fail 
to meet the standard of review.   
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